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ABSTRACT

Emergency services provide an invaluable service to communities and cities around the world.
Research has shown these professionals encounter significant acute psychological stress throughout
their work shifts. Acute stress has been shown to impact human performance in various realms, from
increased risk-taking to cognitive decline. While the actual work varies between firefighters, law
enforcement, and emergency medical services, a shared commonality is the operation of emergency
vehicles. Emergency vehicle crashes are recognized as a serious issue by FEMA. The current work aimed
to measure the impact of acute stress on emergency responders as measured by fatal emergency
vehicle crashes in the United States using a new variable: the type of call to which they were responding.
Utilizing data maintained by the United States Fire Administration, the study reviewed fatality
data of firefighters who died in the line of duty from 2000 to 2019. Deaths from vehicle crashes while
responding to emergency incidents were coded using details from the fatality narratives. Crashes that
led to multiple firefighter fatalities were coded as a single case, yielding 144 cases. These were then
weighted using nationwide response statistics to create an exposure variable for each type of incident.
The exposure was calculated based on the estimated number of responses to each incident type, as well
as the typical number of vehicles that respond to each type of incident.
The results showed a considerably higher ratio of cases occurring while responding to fires
compared to all other types of emergencies. Firefighters encounter over nine times the likelihood of
being involved in a fatal crash while responding to a fire. Specifically, structure-fire responses were
determined to pose the highest risk of encountering a fatal crash during response. When compared to
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emergency medical incidents, which are the most common type of calls to which fire departments
answer, structure-fire responses posed nearly 20 times the risk of a fatal crash occurring.
These results indicate that attempts to reduce motor vehicle crashes among emergency services
should focus on human factors, specifically creating and implementing tools to reduce the acute stress
and urgency produced by responses to certain incident types.
Keywords: firefighter, emergency, response, safety, stress, law enforcement officer, EMS,
vehicle, crash
x., 96 pages
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM
First responders are charged with 24-hour management of emergencies in communities of all
sizes. They are unique in their ability to deliver expedited interventions to situations that threaten lives,
property, and the environment. While fire departments, law enforcement agencies, and emergency
medical services are often well-equipped and well-trained for the hazards they face, there is still a
significant risk involved in the work they perform. When a first responder becomes incapacitated, either
by an injury, sudden illness, or other damaging incident, they are no longer able to offer their unique
services, contributing to the deterioration of conditions at the original emergency scene.
Firefighters, law enforcement officers, and emergency medical technicians share an expected
level of urgency and time pressure to perform tasks with potential life-or-death consequences.
Accordingly, men and women in these types of professions experience significant psychological stress
each time they receive a call for service (Anderson et al., 2002; Karlsson, et al., 2020; Kuorinka &
Korhonen, 1981). Chronic stress is a problem in this population; repeated exposure to emotional stress
is known to cause health conditions, including heart disease, high blood pressure, and posttraumatic
stress disorders (PTSD) (Kales et al., 2003; Kales et al., 2009). With such dire health effects of chronic
occupational stress over the course of a career, what type of acute impact can these instances have?
Acute emotional stress is perhaps best known as the ‘fight-or-flight’ response, and its feelings
and physical signs are a normal human experience. A relatable example could be awakening to a loud
noise in the middle of the night, with a noticeable increase in alertness and a pounding heart.
Emergency responders regularly experience varying degrees of this emotional arousal during their shifts
(Arble et al., 2019; Karlsson et al., 2020), and this increased arousal can lead to negative impacts on
human performance in a variety of ways (Salas et al., 1996). The presence of this stress and its potential
1

to hinder performance leads to the question: How does acute stress negatively impact emergency
responders?
Early emergency management studies examined how a firefighter’s decision-making may be
affected at high-stress scenes (Quarentelli & Dynes, 1976), and modern researchers have also
considered the effects of stress on decision-making by incident commanders (Gasaway, 2007). But, how
does acute stress affect the efficacy, abilities, and safety of responders every day? While the risks
experienced by first responders varies depending on the branch of public service, emergency vehicle
driving is a task that is shared among all three occupations. Does acute stress negatively impact
responders’ ability to safely operate emergency vehicles?
An example of the impact of psychological stress on an emergency vehicle driver is a 1989 crash
of a fire engine and a passenger train in Catlett, Virginia. While responding to a car fire, the fire engine
crossed in front of an oncoming Amtrak passenger train at a railroad crossing. The impact derailed 11
cars and two locomotives, killed two firefighters, seriously injured three other firefighters, and injured
57 people aboard the train (U.S. Fire Administration, 1989). The total damage was over one million
dollars and escalated from what would have been a relatively small incident managed by a single
department to one that required over 70 resources from six surrounding counties. The crash was
ultimately contributed to the driver of the fire engine being under the influence of time pressures and
excitement related to the car fire. This emotional state led to tunnel vision, preventing him from seeing
or hearing the oncoming train. Unfortunately, this risk continues to be problematic for modern
responders operating fire apparatus, law enforcement vehicles, and ambulances.
Between 1990 and 2015 in the United States, there was an unwavering average of
approximately 14,454 fire apparatus crashes per year, which led to an average of 973 firefighter injuries
per year for the same period (Haynes & Molis, 2016). While injuries from vehicle crashes are lower in
frequency than other causes (such as sprains and strains), they tend to lead to more serious outcomes
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(U.S. Fire Administration, 2014). This trend has continued through recent years, with each year typically
encountering 14 firefighter fatalities per year related to emergency service vehicle crashes (ESVCs) from
2009 to 2018 (Fahy & Molis, 2019). These statistics make ESVCs consistently the second leading cause of
firefighter deaths (after sudden cardiac events) and the leading cause of occupational fatalities among
law enforcement officers and paramedics (U.S. Fire Administration, 2014).
Perhaps more concerning than the firefighter injury and fatality rates is the fact that most fire
apparatus crashes also involve civilian vehicles (U.S. Fire Administration, 2014). Of those fatal crashes
that involve a civilian vehicle, Fahy (2008) found that during a 10 year period, fatal crashes involving a
responding fire apparatus and another vehicle were over 10 times more likely to kill a civilian than a
firefighter. Similar statistics are reflected in ambulance crashes. Kahn et al. (2001) found that 78% of
fatalities in ambulance crashes were not the occupants of the ambulance, but rather casualties of
pedestrians or occupants of other vehicles. Trending with fire apparatus and ambulance crashes,
vehicle-related incidents are the leading cause of occupational fatalities for law enforcement officers in
the United States (LaTourrette, 2015).
From a fiscal perspective, a workers’ compensation claim related to a fire apparatus crash is
typically five times more than the average claim among other industries and accounts for the largest
expenses of all types of workers’ compensation claims among firefighters (Butry et al., 2019). This loss of
responder and civilian lives in fire apparatus crashes and the direct costs related with the damages are
only a fraction of the effects of these incidents. A fatal fire apparatus crash can impact a department’s
reputation, morale, and finances for years following the incident (Eckstein, 2004).

Statement of the Problem
Stress is the single most common causal factor of firefighter deaths, typically from cardiacrelated events such as heart attacks and strokes (U.S. Fire Administration, 2020). The sources of this
stress can be physical in nature, but numerous studies have pointed to emotional or psychological stress
3

as being comparable to or exceeding the physical stress these workers encounter (Guidotti, 1992; Huang
et al., 2010). Responders have been shown to have a strong emotional stress response upon being called
to duty, as indicated by multiple physiological markers (Blimkie et al., 1977; Kuorinka & Korhonen,
1981). This psychophysiological response shows a direct relationship to their perceived urgency of the
emergency incident (Baldwin et al., 2019; Brown & Stickford, 2009; Karlsson et al., 2020). For instance, a
paramedic who receives a call to a child choking will likely exhibit a higher heart rate than for an adult
patient having chest pains.
This acute emotional arousal has been shown to negatively impact human performance (Gohm
et al., 2001; Honig & Roland, 1998; Robinson et al., 2013). Other high-stress disciplines, such as aviation,
have recognized this hazard and implemented controls to manage the risk (Durso & Alexander, 2010).
The link between the acute emotional state of responders and its impact on real-life behaviors has not
been well evaluated. To better understand the behaviors of responders, it is essential to gain an
understanding of the exact influences affecting their psychological states.
The type of assistance offered by law enforcement officers, firefighters, and emergency medical
services is varied, but one aspect they all share is their rapid delivery of aid. All three service providers
are expected to hastily transport their specialized equipment and personnel using emergency vehicles.
Emergency service vehicle crashes (ESVCs) continue to be one of the largest risks facing first responders.
Ambulance crashes are the leading cause of death among emergency medical technicians and
paramedics (Maguire & Smith, 2013) and kill more people per collision than crashes of similarly sized
vehicles (Ray & Kupas, 2005). Firefighters and law enforcement officers are more likely to be killed from
a vehicle crash than they are while performing their actual work at emergency scenes (U.S. Fire
Administration, 2014). Besides the risk of death and injury, ESVCs are the leading cause of liability claims
against emergency response agencies (Maguire & Porco, 1997; Wang et. al, 2008).
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Human factors and behaviors continually rank as the single most significant cause of emergency
vehicle crashes (Hsiao et al., 2018). A sense of urgency by responders contributes to aggressive and risky
driving behaviors (Kahn et al., 2001; Clarke et al., 2009). Reducing these incidents is imperative, and to
do so, the underlying causes must be identified and managed. Yet, the most effective interventions for
reducing ESVCs give little attention to understanding and controlling the causes of reckless behavior by
these drivers (Bui, Balland et al., 2018). Therefore, it is reasonable to presume there is a relationship
between the acute stress response of responders and an increased crash risk. The central focus of this
study is to use retrospective data of fatal ESVCs evaluated by the type of incident to which they were
directed as a proxy of the human stress response.

Research Gap
While the presence of chronic stress and its effects are widely researched, the applied effects of
acute stress in this population are not. After noting the extreme psychophysiological response of
firefighters to an alarm, Kuorinka and Korhonen (1981) questioned the potential consequences of this
excited reaction. Paterson et al., (2016) specifically pointed out that “an additional area of concern
highlighted in previous research and identified in the present study was that of a negative physical and
psychological reaction to the alarm stimulus itself” (p. 180). The effects of this stress have been
examined in this population with experiments showing performance impairments (Gohm et al., 2001;
Robinson et al., 2013). However, the impacts of acute stress on real scenarios have not been examined
and could be particularly difficult from an experimental perspective. While studies have indicated
psychological, emotional, and physiological responses to alarms by first responders, mediated by the
type of incident described at the time of dispatch (Karlsson et al., 2020), there have been none
measuring the result of this potentiation.
Acute psychological stress is associated with reducing situational awareness, and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) stresses that “fire and emergency service organizations should
5

concentrate on implementing and demonstrating an effective and measurable model to improve
situational awareness of all responders” (U.S. Fire Administration, 2015, p. 14). Previous research has
indicated psychological components contributing to ESVCs. Although there have been improvements
and a push for culture change, even the most effective interventions and risk management principles
(Bui et al., 2017, Bui et al., 2019), give little attention to better understanding and mitigating the root
cause of the behaviors of the drivers.
Firefighter fatalities are investigated by the United States Fire Administration (USFA), the
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health (NIOSH) and contain numerous variables. However, the relationship between the type of
emergency as a variable in ESVCs has not been specifically examined. It is argued that the behaviors and
errors that lead to ESVCs are caused by a loss of situational awareness by the vehicle operator. FEMA
has targeted better situational awareness as a key to improving first responder safety (U.S. Fire
Administration, 2015).

Purpose and Significance of the Study
The objective of this study is to conduct an exploratory, quantitative analysis using a novel
independent variable of the nature of the emergency. The goal is to determine if a relationship exists
with the dependent variable of crash rates. If a trend is found, it could indicate a link between the
emotional arousal of responders and their actions in the real world. A relationship and understanding of
this impact could lead to improved dispatch policies and techniques to reduce the negative effects. For
example, the aviation industry recognizes this risk and recommends aeromedical pilots be withheld
patient information until after they make the safe decision to fly (Federal Aviation Administration,
2015). This prevents the pilot from succumbing to the pressures to fly when it may otherwise be unsafe
to do so.
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Every fatality in an ESVC is a representation of many more serious injuries, and even more minor
incidents and losses of services. This is known as the Heinrich accident ratio or “safety triangle” (Figure
1) and has traditionally served as a guide to risk management statistics. For a single causal factor, there
exists a ratio of numerous near-miss incidents, fewer minor incidents, and one serious or fatal incident
(Yorio & Moore, 2018).

Figure 1.
Heinrich’s Accident Ratio
Heinrich’s Accident Ratio

Although the ratios of the safety triangle vary and its applicability have been questioned, there
is undoubtedly a similar ratio between ESVCs that result in death and those with less serious outcomes.
Using Heinrich’s theory, controlling one causal factor may reduce some fatalities and may also reduce
numerous serious injuries as well as innumerable minor incidents (i.e., fender benders) and related
expenses. The Federal Emergency Management Agency strives to reduce responder fatalities and
injuries; and understanding the innumerable less serious events that each fatality represents, it would
be reasonable to expect a similar desire from local and state governments as well as insurance
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companies who bear the financial risk. Since most ESVCs are fundamentally caused by human factors,
those factors should receive the research focus to better understand and reduce ESVCs (Hsiao et al,
2018; Ray & Kupas 2007; Saunders & Heye, 1994).
Preventing damage and loss of life from ESVCs by the responders who intend to mitigate
damaging incidents is fundamental in providing effective emergency responses. Examining the variable
of drivers’ emotional states could lead to improved risk management and control techniques for
emergency response agencies and could reduce the burden of ESVCs. Additionally, if a relationship is
found between increased emotional states and crash risk, future research could examine further
impacts of emotion on decision-making and situational awareness, which are vital skills in these
professions.

Glossary of Terms
These terms and acronyms are defined to maintain consistency with past and future research
and to reduce ambiguity:
Company - A group of two or more firefighters that from the basic unit of firefighting
operations. A company typically includes a company officer (supervisor),
driver/operator or engineer, and one or more firefighters and/or EMTs. Companies are
typically assigned to a single apparatus.
Crash - An unstabilized situation, not under human control, that includes at least one harmful
event that includes an occurrence of damage or injury (Association of Transportation
Safety Information Professionals, 2017).
Emergency Vehicle - The legal definition varies from state to state, but for this research is
defined as the following: Any motorized vehicle owned or operated by a law
enforcement agency, fire department, or emergency medical services agency; or any
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personal vehicle being operated by a first responder for transportation related to an
emergency incident.
Entrapment - An emergency condition in which one or more persons are physically prevented
from removing themselves from a location or position due to physical restraint, hazards,
or immobility from injury or illness, and which, without rescue would lead to a decline of
the person or persons’ condition.
Fire Apparatus - An emergency vehicle used by a fire department or used by a firefighter in the
course of their work.
First Responder - Although numerous definitions exist for the term (cf. McDaniel et al., 2013),
the current work will define a first responder as a law enforcement officer, firefighter, or
emergency medical services employee who is responsible for physically arriving at the
scene of an emergency to provide law enforcement, fire suppression, medical care, or
rescue services.
Human Factors - The interactions between a person and the systems with which they work, with
a goal of reducing errors, increasing productivity, and enhancing safety and comfort
(Wickens et al, 1997).
Line of Duty Death – “Deaths directly resulting from traumatic injuries sustained during
response to, at the scene of or during return from an emergency incident, including, but
not limited to, fires, emergency medical calls, hazardous materials incidents, natural
disasters, technical rescue incidents, and search and rescue missions.” (U.S. Fire
Administration, 2020).
Situational Awareness - “The perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of
time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status
in the near future” (Endsley, 1988, p. 97).

9

Tanker - A mobile water supply fire apparatus with a water tank of 1,000 gallons or larger and
whose primary purpose is transporting water; also known as a tender (U.S. Fire
Administration, 2003); For the purposes of the current analysis, any fire apparatus that
carries 1,000 gallons or more is considered a tanker.
Time Pressure - A psychological stressor occurring when less time is available (or perceived to be
available) than is necessary to complete a task or to make a decision.

Organization of the Study
The current study is organized into six chapters that will build upon previous research to create
a theoretical framework in support of the research questions and hypotheses. This first chapter
describes the impact and burden of ESVCs and includes definitions, an introduction to the problem, and
motivation, which are supported in more detail by the literature review in Chapter Two. The third
chapter describes the data sources, methodology, and data analysis. Chapter Four describes the results
of the findings, which are discussed candidly in Chapter Five. The final chapter discloses the weaknesses
of the current work, potential solutions for the findings, and recommendations for future research.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
The professions of firefighting, emergency medical services (EMS), and law enforcement
(collectively, emergency services) are expected to deliver a hasty response to hazardous situations that
threaten people, property, and the environment. These potentially tense scenes understandably place
both acute and chronic psychological stress on the personnel who respond to help. Specifically, this
work examined the effects of stress due to urgency, emphasis on speed, and uncertainty on decisionmaking by first responders. This review aims to examine the acute psychological stressors of responders
and their effect on behaviors, specifically while operating emergency vehicles such as fire apparatus, law
enforcement vehicles, and ambulances. This review will demonstrate that emotional stress is induced in
first responders at the time of alarm: that stress is potentiated by the perceived urgency of the type of
incident and how stress negatively affects behaviors. Of these impacts, the review will focus on the
effects of stress and urgency while operating an emergency vehicle—a task that is shared across
response professions. The hypothesis is that the perceived priority, or perceived urgency of an incident
by responders, mediates the likelihood of a fatal crash while en route to the incident.

Acute Emotional Stress in First Responders
Emergency services are understandably stressful professions, where exposures to emotional and
traumatic events can affect people physically and psychologically. Stress among emergency services
personnel has become more of a focus for FEMA in recent years, with an emphasis on managing chronic
stress and posttraumatic stress disorder (Jahnke et al., 2016; Murphy et al., 1999). It has also long been
established that first responders regularly experience measurable acute stress responses prior to the
condition becoming chronic (e.g., Blimkie et al., 1977; Lim et al., 1987; Murphy et al., 1999). This
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repeated occupational stress is considered a causal factor in the increased rates of cardiac events and
high blood pressure among all three services (Kales et al., 2009).
Acute stress is considered a normal, generalized response by the human body, triggered by either
physical or emotional stimuli (Selye, 1956). An acute emotional stress response is defined here using
Salas et al.’s (1996) definition as a high-demand, high-threat situation, which is time-limited, where task
performance is critical and consequences of failure can be catastrophic. Ursin and Eriksen’s (2004)
theory framed the response with four components: the stressor, the perception or appraisal of that
stressor, an increase in arousal (physiological response), and feedback that informs the brain of the
body’s aroused state (such as the feeling of your heart rate increasing). This interaction is
psychosomatic—both emotional and physiological—and is familiar to many as the fight-or-flight
response, credited to Cannon (1932). Although stress can be chronic, the current work is focused on the
acute, short-term effects of stress and particularly how they can negatively affect emergency
responders.

Measuring Acute Stress
The emotional aspects of stress must be described subjectively as constructs (i.e. excited,
fearful, angry), but the body’s physiological responses to stress are able to be objectively measured.
What proves to be more specific to the acute stress response is the outwardly measurable physical signs
it provokes, and there are multiple ways of measuring these physical markers. When a person
encounters a stressor, the body’s sympathetic nervous system is triggered to release catecholamines:
stress hormones including epinephrine (adrenaline) and cortisol (Ursin & Erikson, 2004). Concentrations
of catecholamines can be measured through sampling of blood, saliva, or hair (Boucher & Plusquellec,
2019). Acute stress can also be measured through less-invasive means, including heart rate, respiratory
rate, and blood pressure (Campbell & Ehlert, 2012). Campbell and Ehlert (2012) performed a review of
emotion and stress response and found the best psychophysiological measures were by increases in
12

salivary cortisol, heart rate, blood pressure, plasma cortisol, and plasma adrenocorticotropic
horomones. Although these markers can all be linked to a general, nonspecific stress response by
humans, the one with the most specificity to emotional response is cortisol (Weiner, 1992; Dickerson &
Kemeny, 2004). However, measuring cortisol requires a person to pause their work to obtain either a
blood draw or saliva sample, making instantaneous measures of cortisol among emergency responders
difficult. The measure of heart rate of emergency responders seems to be the preferred method of
measuring instantaneous stress, as technology allows for wearable monitoring systems without
interfering with the subject’s work (e.g. Brown & Stickford, 2009; Johnson et al., 2020; Karlsson et al.,
2011). As such, heart rate has been shown as a reliable indicator for acute stress in aircraft pilots (Regula
et al., 2014). The measure of heart rate as an indication of emotional stress can be confounded since
heart rate also increases during times of increased physical activity. Increased heart rate absent of
physical activity is accepted as an indication of an emotional stress response (Johnson et al. 2020;
Karlsson et al., 2011), but requires accounting for physical activity during the monitoring period.

Acute Stress Stimuli
The emotional stress response is initiated by a stressor, which is a stimulating event as
appraised by the person (Lazarus, 1993). Dickerson and Kemeny (2004) summarized stress stimuli into
three broad categories: social self-preservation threats, social-evaluative threat, and uncontrollability.
Dickerson and Kemeny’s categorization of these threats are all internal. Conversely, Salas et al. (1996)
categorized environmental or external stressors to include noise, time pressure, task load, threats, and
group pressures. Considering each of Salas et al.’s (1996) described stressors, it can imaginably be
expected that all would be present during emergency responses. While the appraisal of these stressors
is subjective, based on past experience or personality traits, there are trends among first responders of
shared real-world stress triggers. Long and unpredictable work shifts, social pressures, uncertainty, highpressure decisions, and past traumatic experiences have all been credited with inducing stress
13

(Anderson et al., 2002; Paterson et al.; 2016; Ruzsa-Rabovszky, 2012). It has also been hypothesized that
this emotional response is due to the uncertainty of the impending scene, or from an anticipatory
reaction related to past traumatic experiences (Paterson et al., 2016).

Acute Stress Sources in Emergency Responders
Of the three branches of emergency services, firefighters seem to be the most-studied
population in regard to stress indicators and stimuli, likely due to the profession’s continual high rates of
cardiac events (Kales et al., 2003; National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2007). The
emotional and acute psychological stress that firefighters are placed under has been proposed to exceed
the stress levels spurred by strenuous physical activity (Guidotti, 1992). To demonstrate this
psychogenic stress that firefighters experience, Huang et al. (2010) compared heart rates of firefighters
performing a firefighting strategy challenge simulation to those during vigorous exercise and found the
simulation group to be significantly higher.

Alarm Stimuli in Firefighters.
The most notable trigger for acute emotional stress in many cases is not the excitement at the
emergency incident, but rather the anticipation of the incident upon receiving the call. This has been
credited to unpredictability of the impending emergency scene (Guidotti, 1992). Firefighters in another
study described feelings of excited worry when receiving an alarm: “The adrenaline starts pumping and
you start worrying about everybody else…” (Paterson et al., 2016, p.178). The physiological effects from
these emotions have been described as causing a “rush” or “spike”, leading to shaking hands and
headaches (Paterson et al., 2016). Guidotti (1992) noted urgency, or time pressures, as a high-ranking
source of stress among emergency responders, which was most apparent in smaller cities, which was
considered by the author to possibly indicate a personal drive to help victims.
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Other early studies noted a significant stress response as measured by a heart rate increase
occurring at the moment firefighters received an alarm (Barnard & Duncan, 1975). Barnard and
Duncan’s (1975) results showed an average increase in heart rate of 47 beats per minute (bpm) within
15 to 30 seconds after the alarm, and remaining elevated while en route to the incident. A similar study
by Blimkie et al. (1977) also noted significant increases in heart rates by Canadian firefighters at an
average of 66.2 bpm, as well as increased catecholamines (stress hormones). Since the levels of this
stress hormone were measured prior to physical exertion, the explanation again indicates an emotional
response after hearing the dispatch (Blimkie et al., 1977). A study among firefighters in Singapore again
found an average spike in heart rate beginning at the time of alarm and increasing to the time of leaving
the station (Lim et al., 1987). Kuorinka and Korhonen (1981) were among the first to research the
effects of firefighters’ response to an alarm specifically from a psychosomatic perspective, and
witnessed an average heart rate increase of 61 bpm over their resting heart rate.
Brown and Stickford (2009) studied the physiological work of professional firefighters in
Indianapolis, Indiana. Firefighters wore monitors to log their heart rate and respirations during the
entirety of their 24-hour duty shifts and the study found that these increases in heart rate were again
not always correlated with physical activity (Brown & Stickford, 2009). Rather, they noted that heart
rates and respirations significantly increased at the time the call was initially dispatched which was
contributed to a release of hormones from an emotional trigger (Brown & Stickford, 2009).

Alarm Stimuli in Law Enforcement Officers.
Like the fire service, law enforcement is considered a high-stress occupation with increased
rates of chronic stress-related disease (Zimmerman, 2012). Law enforcement officers are expected to
experience physically demanding stressors such as foot pursuits and physical altercations. Acutely, law
enforcement officers have also been shown to elicit similar psychosomatic stress responses as Anderson
et al., (2002) described:
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Spotting a stolen vehicle, responding to a Code 3, a high-speed chase, conflict with a suspect,
entering a household with a crime in progress, or technical difficulties with equipment essential
to job performance are among the plethora of examples of situations that can elicit an acute
stress response in police officers. (p.403)
Law enforcement officers’ psychosomatic stress has been objectively measured using heart rate
monitors while on duty (Anderson et al., 2002; Baldwin et al., 2019). Measurements of heart rate above
individual resting rates by Anderson et al. (2002) found a significant spike on average of 40 bpm when
an officer placed their hand on their firearm, and 49 bpm increase when a suspect was present for the
same actions. The same study found significant differences between responding to various dispatches;
they noteded especially increased arousal to calls that were related to providing back-up for another
officer (Anderson et al., 2002). Anticipatory spikes in officers’ heart rates after being dispatched and
while responding were also found by both Anderson et al. (2002) and Baldwin et al. (2019). The peaks of
these psychological anticipatory heart rates were matched only by the actual encounter with the
stressor upon arriving at the scene (Baldwin et al., 2019). Measurements of officers’ cortisol levels in
relationship to stimuli seem slightly ambiguous, with levels increasing at the beginning of shifts or initial
calls and remaining constant (Arble et al., 2019; Giessing et al., 2020). This is blamed partially on
possible adaptations to cope with the stressors or the continual states of vigilance while on duty.

Stimuli in Emergency Medical Services.
Personnel working in emergency medical services experience emotional stressors in similar ways
to firefighters and law enforcement officers. Goldstein et al. (1992) found increased overall blood
pressures while paramedics were at work and suggested psychological stressors from unexpected
nature of calls and emergency driving as possible sources. A study by Witzel et al. (1999) confirmed that
healthy passengers in ambulances experience greater emotional stress during emergency transport than
during normal driving as measured by their blood pressure, heart rates, and stress hormones.
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Physiological responses to receiving a dispatch call among paramedics mirrored the anticipatory
responses of firefighters and law enforcement officers, with an average spike in heart rate of 37.6%
above resting for paramedics at the time of alarm (Karlsson et al., 2020). This anticipatory response
seems to be consistent across all ages and experience levels and actually exceeds the average heart
rates experienced at the scene of the emergency (Karlsson et al, 2011).

Potentiators of Acute Stress.
Firefighters, law enforcement officers, and emergency medical technicians have all been shown
to exhibit an anticipatory emotional stress response to being dispatched to an emergency incident. The
level of these physiological responses is not constant for every dispatch. Rather, it is potentiated by the
incident type and perceived urgency by the responder. For instance, “true emergencies” were shown to
impart a stronger reaction than “false alarms” in firefighters in Singapore (Lim et al., 1987). Barnard and
Duncan (1975) described a particularly “excited response” of physiological measures while traveling to a
large structure fire compared to other incident types. The Brown and Stickford (2009) study described
firefighters experiencing significantly increased physiological responses to dispatches when they heard
the keyword “entrapment” compared to other types of incidents (p < .05). Paterson et al. (2016) made a
similar observation regarding entrapment:
“More urgent alarms are associated with more prolonged and severe physiological responses.
For example, responding to an MVA [motor vehicle accident] where people are trapped results
in a more sustained physiological stress response than responding to an animal rescue” (p. 178).
Incidents involving entrapped victims can be more complex in nature, requiring more resources, hasty
searches, which imparts a sense of increased time pressure. Unfortunately, the Brown and Stickford
(2009) study did not parse alarms into further categories, such as responses to vehicle accidents or
emergency medical calls, limiting the data available on firefighters’ psychophysiological responses to
various alarm types.
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Ambulance personnel also have a significantly higher psychophysiological response from certain
types of incidents. During qualitative interviews, paramedics have reported an increased sense of
urgency when they learn the patient is a child (Koski & Sumanen, 2019). This was supported by data
showing that EMS workers have a significantly higher stress response for dispatches that involve
children relative to all other call types (Karlsson et al., 2011). Later research placed the alarms into seven
categories: traffic accidents, children (pediatric), medical problems, neurological problems, surgical or
orthopedic problems, cardiopulmonary resuscitation/death, and other (Karlsson et al., 2020). They
found that cortisol levels were significantly increased (by 10% or more) for calls involving children and
calls to traffic accidents (Karlsson et al., 2020), compared to other incident types. This increased reaction
could be an anticipatory response to what has been described as the most stressful experience a
responder can endure: the inability to save a child victim (Guidotti, 1992).
Law enforcement officers also exhibit significantly increased emotions specific to instances of
percieved urgency. While en route to calls warranting an emergency response, law enforcement officers
exhibited considerably higher heart rates compared to normal driving (Anderson et al., 2002). That
emotional arousal was especially apparent when responding to back up another officer (Anderson et al.,
2002). In another study, officers exuded statistically significant elevated heart rates (p < 0.001) relative
to the perceived urgency of the call, such as calls reported as involving weapons (Baldwin et al., 2019).
This variation of stress responses mimics those of firefighters and EMS workers, whereas certain types
of calls elicit an increased anticipatory rush over others.

Noise and Stress
While anticipation, uncertainty, and time pressures are expected stressors during emergency
response, the effects of sound should also be considered as a potential confounding variable in the
emotional-stress response chain. “Noise is defined as sound that is unwanted by the listener because it
is unpleasant, bothersome, interferes with task activity, or perceived as being potentially harmful”
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(Salaset al., 1996, p. 14). Sounds and noise can impart arousal in humans (Teichner et al., 1963), whereas
the alarm would be intended to impart some level of arousal or attention to spur action. When
firefighters and paramedics are first alerted for an incident, they typically receive an audible cue such as
a bell, buzzer, or tone (Kuorinka & Korhonen, 1981; MacNeal et al., 2016). While this sound would not
be considered “noise” since it provides useful information, it does seem to be responsible for at least
some of the stress response. The sound of an alarm has been hypothesized to potentially spur a
Pavlovian response, whereas the sound stimuli becomes learned and tied to physiological stimulation
(Ruzsa-Rabovszky, 2012). Alternatively, the type of sound that is first heard could impart a startle
response, especially while sleeping (Hall et al., 2016). However, the physiological response appears to
only occur when the dispatch’s verbal details are given, which is after the alarm tone (Kuorinka &
Korhonen, 1981). This means firefighters are experiencing the response only after learning the details of
the call and processing the information.
Similar descriptions by Lim et al. (1987) noted that the stress reaction did not occur for false
alarms, but increased after the bell and then continued upward only when firefighters received the
details of a true emergency call. This was again demonstrated by MacNeal et al. (2016) when groups of
firefighters who heard an alarm but were not expected to respond did not elicit the significant increase
in heart rate of those who were assigned to the incident. If the initial alarm tone is programmed to
slowly ramp up in volume rather than a sounding a sudden loud alarm, it can somewhat attenuate the
stress response for the minutes following an alarm (MacNeal et al., 2016). The psychophysiological
impact of noise is often maintained after the alarm by the emergency vehicle’s siren (Guidotti, 1992),
which is discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

Effects of Acute Stress
When a person experiences a stress stimulus like time pressure, they respond with physiological
signs such as increased respirations, heart rate, blood pressure, vasoconstriction, and pupil dilation
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(Kramer, 1990). The outward physiological signs are an indication of the body’s sympathetic nervous
system’s response to releasing stress hormones such as adrenaline and cortisol. This feeling is
commonly known as the fight-or-flight” response (Cannon, 1932), assumed to prepare the body to
defend itself or flee from a potential threat. This function is helpful if an increase in physical prowess is
demanded to ensure survival. However, these strong physiological responses can have a negative
impact on important cognitive processes on which responders rely, including decision-making and
situational awareness (Slovic, 1987).

Negative Effects of Emotional Stress
While the sympathetic stress response at moderate levels can improve some tasks, there
reaches a level of stimulation where performance begins to decline. This is referred to as the Yerkes–
Dodson law (1908), or “inverted U” of stress and performance, with an ideal level of stress depending on
the task (Teigen, 1994). The ideal level of stress has also been labeled as “eustress”, with higher levels of
stimulation causing the person to enter into a state of “distress” as first labeled by Selye (1976). This
curve has been modifed and adapted over the years by many and applied accross various disciplines.
This relationship of emotional stress levels to performance is illustrated in Figure 2, with the stressresponse curve and related effects at varying levels of psychological stress.
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Figure 2
The Arousal/Performance Curve

Note. Yerkes–Dodson curve, modified from Grossman and Christensen (2008).

In clinical and experimental settings, acute emotional stress is typically induced using stimuli of
social pressures or potential judgment (Campbell & Ehlert, 2012). While these stressors are typically far
less than those encountered in the real world, they are able to elicit negative impacts in tests of
judgment, perception, and motor skills. Acute stress-induced cortisol increases have been corrolated
with increased risk-taking behavior, especially when the risk was absent of any immediate perceived
consequences (Buckert et al., 2014; Starke et al., 2008). While cortisol has shown a relationship with
behavior and decision-making, it varies depending on the stimuli, can vary between sexes (van den Bos
et al., 2014), and may have other variables such as levels of uncertainty.
Effects of Stress on First Responders. Although emergency services vary in the type of work
they perform, all three have been shown to be negatively impacted by psychological stressors.
Paramedics in high-stress scenarios demonstrated increased clinical errors that were relative to
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increased stress (p < .05), as measured by cortisol levels (LeBlanc et al., 2012). During a simulated
firefighting training scenario, Robinson et al. (2013) found a corrolation between increased stress as
measured by cortisol levels and an increase in cognitive impairment. Similar work by Gohm et al. (2001)
found self-reported cognitive decline relative to acute stress-induced anxiety. Law enforcement officers’
ability to make rational decisions has been shown to be negatively affected by increased stress (Akinola
& Mendes, 2012). And during the highest moments of stress, law enforcement officers involved in
shootings have reported perceptual disturbances, including skewed time perception, tunnel vision, and
distorted sound levels (Honig & Roland, 1998). Ray et al. (2006) found corrolations between increased
stress hormone levels and reported behavioral problems among Indian firefighters. These studies lead
to a common concern, as described by Perroni et al., (2014, p. 12): “From analysis of the literature, we
could observe how environmental, physical and emotional stress to which the firefighters are subjected
during their work activities could lead to occupational hazards, injuries and even fatal events.”
Emotional Stress While Driving. While the jobs vary between law enforcement, fighting fires,
and emergency medical services, they share one commonality: driving emergency vehicles. The above
instances of time pressure and noise-induced stress among first responders, paired with the potential
acute effects of stress, would lead to an expected influence of stress on responders’ driving abilities. In
interviews, EMS personnel have admitted that drivers often “have an urgent desire to reach the patient
as quickly as possible and this leads to excessive risk taking” (Koski & Sumanen, 2019, p. 44). The
emotional state of a driver has been shown to strongly affect risk perception (Hu et al., 2012; Lu et al.,
2013), and time pressure has been shown to induce arousal and negative emotions, leading to a skewed
underestimation of a vehicle’s speed (Coeugnet et al., 2013). Fitzpatrick et al. (2017) found similar
behaviors when examining driving while under time pressure, indicating more aggressive maneuvers.
Anger and frustration have also been shown to increase risk-taking with behaviors such as rushing
through yellow lights and speeding (Abdu et al., 2012).
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The causes of the aggressive and risky driving habits during emergency mode have been
contributed to perceived urgency and time pressures by emergency vehicle drivers (Hsiao et al., 2018).
The concept of time pressure leading to crashes is referred to as “driving under emotion” by Hsiao et al.
(2018). More colloquially, this phenomenon is known as “sirencide” and is defined as the “…emotional
reaction of emergency vehicle drivers when they begin to feel a sense of power and urgency that blocks
out reason and prudence, leading to the reckless operation of the emergency vehicle” (Firefighter’s
News, 1990, pp. 36–37, as cited in Kolstad, 1991). The fire service has a well-known culture of urgency,
which has been targeted as a problem in need of attention (U.S. Fire Administration, 2015).
Sirencide. Emergency vehicle sirens are designed to impart a sense of urgency and warning to
drivers of other vehicles (Catchpole & McKeown, 2007). While design standards have attempted to
reduce the sounds inside the cabin of the emergency vehicle, significant noise still reaches the first
responders and patients inside the emergency vehicle (Van Buren & Caple, 1987). The collateral siren
noise may fuel the perturbations from dispatch and affect driver behavior. Flashing red lights and
audible bells have been specifically shown to increase risk-taking behavior and compulsory decisionmaking (Brevers et al., 2015). Traveling in an emergency vehicle operating with lights and sirens
significantly increases heart rate, blood pressure, and stress hormones such as cortisol (Dörges et al.,
2001; Witzel et al., 1999).
The relationship between emergency response and likelihood of crashing is well researched, and
overall indicates a strong association compared to normal driving. Research by Becker et al. (2003)
compared the two modes of driving during a 10 year period ending in 1997 and found that for
firefighting vehicles, 62.18% of all crashes occurred during emergency response versus nonemergency.
Of those same crashes, occupants were far more likely to be seriously injured or killed during emergency
response compared to nonemergency driving (Becker et al., 2003). Data from 2000 through 2009
indicated that 66% of fire apparatus crashes occured during emergency response (Donoughe et al.,
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2012) versus nonemergency mode. These trends continued from 2002 through 2012 with 70% of
crashes of firefighting vehicles occuring during emergency mode (Hsiao et al., 2018).
Ambulances are also more likely to be involved in a crash while operating in emergency mode.
Research from 1989 to 1997 on EMS calls in Denver found that although 75% of responses utilized lights
and sirens, 91% of all collisions were during emergency mode (Custalow & Gravitz, 2004). In EMS
crashes, Watanabe et al. (2019) again found that emergency operation was strongly associated with
increased risk of crashing, particularly while transporting patients. One study indicated that fire and EMS
vehicles were no more likely to crash during emergency mode. However, the data in that study excluded
any event where the emergency vehicle driver was at fault, significantly limiting the study’s validity
(Missikpode et al., 2018).
Similarly, the findings by Becker et al. (2003) on law enforcement vehicles showed that 52.3% of
all crashes were during emergency response. Using data from 2005 to 2013, Missikpode et al. (2018)
found law enforcement vehicles to be 1.8 times more likely to be involved in a crash during emergency
response versus nonemergency. While this may seem insignificant, it is important to understand the
mileage driven in each mode as exposure, since law enforcement work involves a large portion of
nonemergency driving (i.e., patrolling).
Crashes during emergency operation seem to be more harmful and deadly than those that occur
in nonemergency mode. Ambulance crashes during emergency mode are more likely to cause injuries to
a higher number of people than would the same crash involving a similarly sized vehicle (Ray & Kupas,
2005) and are twice as likely to cause an injury than during nonemergency mode (Saunders & Heye,
1994). Pirrallo and Swor (1994) found that 69% of the fatal ambulance crashes occurred while operating
in emergency mode. For firefighting apparatus, Fahy (2008) indicated 85.7% of the fatalities that
occurred as a result of a fire apparatus crash were during emergency-mode response. The increase in
crashes during emergency response was attributed to more aggressive, riskier driving. Bui, Hu, et al.,
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(2018) used computer vehicle recorders installed in fire department ambulances and found more
aggressive driving behaviors during emergency responses, which were associated with higher risk of a
crash. These behaviors included speeding and more aggressive acceleration, cornering, and braking (Bui,
Hu et al., 2018). Compounding the risk of aggressive driving, data also indicated reduced seat belt use
during emergency responses, raising the risk of injury or death during a crash (Becker et al., 2003;
Savolainen et al, 2009).
These trends are similar in other parts of the world. Ambulance crashes in Taiwan are the
leading cause of fatalities among EMS personnel and are 1.7 times more likely to result in death than
other traffic accidents in Taiwan (Chiu et al., 2018). In Finland, EMS personnel described difficulty
communicating with each other inside of the cabs of ambulances due to the noise from the siren during
response. In the United Kingdom, emergency vehicles were the only type of vehicle that had higher
rates of collisions due to time pressure and excess speed (Clarke et al., 2009).

Emotional Momentum
Although a typical stress response may wane after the stressor has been removed, it seems that
emergency services personnel will continue to exhibit signs of the stressor for a length of time
proportionate to their perceived urgency of the incident. Barnard and Duncan (1975) noted a
cumulative effect of increased heart rates after firefighters experienced multiple alarms in a short
period of time. A qualitative study on firefighters noted prolonged physiological signs lingering after
high-stress calls (Paterson et al., 2016). Elevated heart rates were found in volunteer and paid-on-call
firefighters 75–90 minutes after being alerted, which was more apparent at night (Service, 2015). This
prolonged physiological response following calls was also corroborated by Brown and Stickford (2009),
who noted that hours after returning from a particularly stressful rescue, heart rates remained in excess
of 100 beats per minute. Studies on law enforcement officers also found instances of elevated heart
rates 30–60 minutes after a critical incident and noted hypervigilence remained throughout officers’
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shifts (Anderson et al., 2002). This indicates a potential relationship between perceived urgency of the
incident and the length of effect that the stress from a call can have.

Theoretical Model
The previous research has built evidence to propose the current theoretical model. Whereas
firefighters, law enforcement officers, and emergency medical personnel have been shown to elicit a
significant acute stress response to a dispatched call, the acute stress response seems to be mediated by
the perceived urgency and type of emergency, with an increased stress response to perceived highpriority calls. The human acute stress response has been shown to affect behavior, perception, and
cognition, affecting drivers. All emergency responders share the similar task of responding in emergency
vehicles. This stress response has been shown to outlast the actual incident. Emergency service vehicle
crashes are more common while responding in emergency mode than during normal driving. These past
studies support the logic of the theoretical model illustrated in Figure 3.

Figure 3
Theoretical Model

Note. Grey boxes represent the research gap, which the current study intends to fill.

Summary
The preceding chapter has reviewed research spanning over a century and bridging multiple
disciplines. In the 1970s, the first studies on the physiology of firefighters found that there was a stress
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response at the time of receiving an alarm absent of physical stressors, indicating a psychological trigger.
These were followed up by similar studies on paramedics and law enforcement officers. More in-depth
research revealed that this psychosomatic stress response is increased when the responders perceive
the call to be more urgent, such as a law enforcement officer assisting a fellow officer. This increased
stress is significant and measurable by multiple objective indicators, including heart rate and stress
hormones. Increased levels of stress and arousal states are able to cause decreased physical and
cognitive performance.
All these emergency professions share a similar task of driving emergency vehicles equipped
with warning lights and sirens. Operating a motor vehicle while under time pressure or aroused
emotional state can increase driver aggressiveness and risk-taking. To further amplify this, driving a
vehicle with lights and sirens activated is linked to further psychophysiological perturbations and
correlated to an increased likelihood of crashing.
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODS
The goal of this study is to examine the relationship between the type of emergency to which an
emergency vehicle is responding and the likelihood of experiencing a fatal crash. The structure of this
work will be a quantitative, retrospective comparison exploring previously collected data on fatal
emergency vehicle crashes. A vehicle crash, as with any type of damaging incident, can be assessed
using multiple variables. The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health publishes standards
on motor vehicle crash and safety analysis (NIOSH, 2014) to guide investigators and researchers in
standardizing data. The NIOSH (2014) standard breaks a crash down into three factors—human, vehicle,
and environmental—and three phases: precrash, crash, and postcrash. Precrash factors are anything
occurring prior to impact, while the post-crash phase begins after the initial damaging event has ceased.
The primary focus of this study will examine the human factors during the precrash moments.

Population and Data Sources
Given the similarity of crash rates between the three types of first responders, especially during
emergency response mode, the ideal population of this study would encompass all three professionals.
Multiple sources for data exist for vehicle crashes and for fatalities among first responders. However,
most sources lack the detail to assess each crash individually. What is required to be useful in this study
would be sources which contain the following variables:
1. Counts of fatal ESVCs in the United States with details of each crash including:
a. If the ESV was responding to a call for assistance
b. The type of assistance requested (i.e., fire, medical emergency, rescue)
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2. The total number of responses by other agencies nationwide, parsed into categories to
allow estimates of exposures to each type of incident
These variables would first allow a count to be made of fatal crashes, classified according to the incident
type. This alone would provide a comparable rate of crashes based on call type but would not be
accurate unless controlled for incident rates. For example, if counts indicated half of all fatal ambulance
crashes occurred while responding to calls involving children, it likely would not be significant if half of
the EMS calls nationwide involved children. Similarly, evaluations for law enforcement rates of crashes
while responding to calls versus normal driving could be skewed dependent on the miles driven while
responding relative to nonemergency driving or patrolling. Additionally, the type of driving by
firefighters is more linear than by EMS and law enforcement, (i.e., from the fire station to the incident,
and back), making the fire service a preferred focus for the impacts of stress momentum following
incidents.
The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) compiles annual statistics for Law Enforcement
Officers Killed or Assaulted (LEOKA) in the United States. This data is available publicly and includes
crash variables, including the type of driving (i.e., emergency response versus patrolling). However, the
data is published each year as distilled infographics, limiting the matching of variables to form
relationships. Even less data is compiled on EMS crashes as no single entity collects detailed data on
EMS fatalities unless they operate as part of a fire department. However, approximately 40% of EMS
agencies do operate as part of fire departments, allowing for some overlap of sampling for EMS fatalities
as firefighters.

Data Sources: USFA and NFIRS
The Federal Emergency Management Agency houses the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) which
is tasked with maintaining data related to the problem of fire in the United States by the Federal Fire
Prevention and Control Act of 1974 (PL 93-498). Reliable statistics for firefighter fatalities in the United
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States are available from the USFA, who keeps record of every reported line-of-duty death in the United
States as well as detailed statistics on fire department responses using the National Fire Incident
Reporting System (NFIRS).
The USFA fatality data includes the following variables: state, age, gender, classification (i.e.,
paid or volunteer), cause of injury, type of injury, type of duty (i.e., responding, returning, training, etc.),
type of activity (specific task), type of incident (if the death occurred relative to an incident), and type of
property on which the fatality occurred. Additionally, the USFA publishes annual reports that provide a
brief narrative of the circumstances of each fatality. To supplement and validate these reports, NIOSH, a
division of the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), selectively performs firefighter fatality investigations
for certain deaths deemed important or unique, with the goal of making safety recommendations. These
reports are perhaps the most thorough and can be compared to the USFA reports to supplement more
details when available. The USFA offers a tool on their website that allows users to sort firefighter
fatalities using the recorded variables. This tool allows the user to select the “cause of fatal injury” as
“vehicle collision” and quickly compare with the “type of incident” variable. However, the resultant
counts are for fatalities, not fatal crashes. This means that any single crash that killed multiple
firefighters would skew the data. Another issue is that some of the fatalities during response seem to
have their related incident listed as vehicle crash, regardless of what they were actually responding to.

Inclusion Criteria
One fatal crash incident (case) will be counted as:
•

A vehicle crash that directly causes one or more firefighter deaths and considered to be in the
line of duty by USFA
o

Any type of vehicles will be included, except aircraft, so long as the purpose is
transporting one or more firefighters to or from the scene of an emergency, or to the
fire station for the purpose of responding to an emergency.
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o

The motor vehicle can be personally owned or a department vehicle, motorcycle, ATV,
or bicycle being used for the above purpose, operating with or without lights and
sirens.

Exclusion Criteria
•

Fatalities due to mechanical failures (e.g., door latch breaks and passenger falls out of the
vehicle), falling off a vehicle, or acts of God (e.g., a tree falling on the vehicle)

•

Fatalities due to medical events (e.g., the driver having a heart-attack while driving)

•

Fatalities operating heavy equipment, such as bulldozers or tractors (unless it was being used
solely as a vehicle for transport as described above)

•

Any instance where the incident type is unknown (unless it can be obtained through news
searches, or interview)

•

Fatalities from ESVCs that were not related to an emergency incident, including training or
driving for fuel or maintenance

•

Fatalities involving aircraft crashes

Primary variables keyed to the incident will include:
•

The type of incident in which the vehicle was traveling to or returning from, using the USFA’s
National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS) format

•

Whether the vehicle was responding to, or returning from, an emergency incident

Since fire departments respond to more of certain types of incidents than others, the exposure will
be varied by call type. This data will be based on national annual averages, from the NFIRS database.
Incident data collected in NFIRS from fire departments is split into nine broad categories: Fires,
Overpressure Rupture/Explosions, EMS and Rescue, Good Intent Calls, False Alarm and False Calls,
Service Calls, Hazardous Conditions (no fire), Special Incidents, and Severe Weather incidents.
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Not all incidents to which fire departments respond require the same type or number of fire
apparatus. Response assignments are typically proportionate to the scale and type of the emergency
being responded to. For instance, a single fire department engine company would typically be able to
handle a call to a minor vehicle crash or investigate a complaint of outside burning, while a call to a
complex rescue or a fire inside a structure would necessitate a larger response. Also, this scaling of
response may be relative to the size of the building. Since alarms to high-rise buildings or other large
commercial structures pose a higher potential for damage, they would typically have a larger number of
assigned companies. Therefore, it would be expected that the response to certain types of incidents
would have higher rates of ESVCs, proportionate to the number of responding units dispatched. While
typical assignments vary between districts, a control for this variability can be deduced using national
fire department response data from the USFA’s National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS); these
reports include the number and type of units that responded to each reported incident.
Factoring the Variables
The independent variable in this study is the number of exposures (responses) to each incident
type as measured by national annual rates. The incidents in the NFIRS database are classified into nine
broad categories and dozens of subcategories, allowing detailed rates of every type of emergency
incident. To improve accuracy of this exposure rate, each response type will be weighted based on the
average number of fire apparatus that respond to that incident as a multiplier. The exposure rate for
each incident type will be calculated using the following formula:
For each year: (𝑻 × 𝑪) × 𝑨 = 𝑬
T = Total number of incidents (all categories) responded to, nationwide (NFPA)
C = Percentage of calls to a particular incident type, nationwide (NFIRS)
A = The average number of apparatus that responded to that incident category (NFIRS)
E = Exposure rate for that type of incident for that year

32

The dependent variable is the number of crashes for a given incident type each year. Crashes
will also be coded by responding versus returning, but the independent variable will be the same since
every trip to an incident requires a similar return trip home. This process will be repeated for each year.

Limitations of NFIRS Data
Unfortunately, there are limitations to using NFIRS data. The data that is compiled by NFIRS is
voluntary; no fire department is required to utilize this free reporting system. Yet approximately 80% of
fire departments utilize it, and reliability of the statistics are declared to be representative of the
entirety of responses of fire departments across the United States. Data gathered on firefighter deaths
by the USFA follows the same format but is actively collected by the agency, rather than allowing
voluntary participation, making the data on fatalities highly reliable.

Supplemental Data Sources: NFPA and NHTSA
To better understand trends of crashes over time, it is important to consider trends in the
number of total incidents to which fire departments respond. It is also important to understand that
reporting using the NFIRS system is voluntary (FEMA, 2015). Since participation has increased among
U.S. fire departments over the 20-year time span being examined, its application for trends of total
incidents per year is limited. To examine how total response numbers and ratios of fires versus other call
types have changed over time, the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) offers a dataset of
estimates based on annual nationwide surveys of fire department responses and incident categories
(National Fire Protection Association [NFPA], 2021).
Additionally, NFPA publishes estimates on vehicle collisions involving firefighters every year
(Campbell & Evarts, 2020). These estimates are separated into collisions involving fire department
apparatus and collisions in personal vehicles while responding or returning to calls. The data also
includes estimates of injuries relating to vehicle crashes for both cases back to 1981. These estimates
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will assist in understanding the trends of crashes overall compared to ones that result in a firefighter
death.
Finally, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) publishes annual reports on
traffic crashes in the United States, which includes a section for people killed in crashes involving
emergency vehicles (National Center for Statistics and Analysis, 2021). While this data does not report
the number of fatal crashes, it does report the number of fatalities as gathered by police reports. This
allows a comparison of fatalities between fire trucks, ambulances, and law enforcement vehicles.
Additionally, the data is available over the same 20-year period for this current analysis. This will allow
trends of fatalities related to emergency vehicles by year to compare to our primary data.
Research Questions and Hypothesis
The following questions are based on the previous literature:
Q1. Are fatal ESVC rates among responding firefighters evenly distributed among all types of
incidents proportional to incident rates?
Q2. When weighted for exposure rates, what incidents have the highest fatal crash rate of
firefighters while responding?
Using the above questions, it is hypothesized that fatal firefighter ESVCs will be higher for incidents
related to “fires” or “entrapment” compared to other incident types.
Data Analysis
The current study is examining a 20-year period from 2000 to 2019. While many studies will use
a sample of 10 years, given the relatively small subset of data for crashes while responding only, it was
deemed beneficial to examine a longer period. This analysis can be divided into three subsets. The first
and most pivotal part of this analysis involves reviewing and coding thousands of firefighter fatalities
from the U.S. Fire Administration’s firefighter fatality reports using the previously described protocol.
The first section provides a summary of each year’s findings, logic of coding, and validation of these
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reports. The data obtained in the second section is intended to make the first dataset more useful by
understanding the exposure rates of responses that led to the fatal crashes. The final section is meant to
further compare trends over time compared to our trends of fatal crashes.

United States Fire Administration Firefighter Fatalities
A spreadsheet of all U.S. firefighter fatalities from 2000 to 2019 was obtained from the USFA
(U.S. Fire Administration, 2021). This spreadsheet contained 2,355 firefighter fatalities coded into 15
variables:
Initial Summary, First Name, Last Name, Middle Name, Age, Rank, Classification,
Incident Date, Date of death, Cause of Death, Nature of Death, Activity, Emergency,
Duty, Property Type
The variables of personal demographics including name, age, and rank were not used for
statistical analysis because there may have been more than one fatality per incident, which
makes these identifiers not applicable to the incident. The variable of Classification is used to
identify whether the firefighters were volunteer, career, or paid-on-call for their service. This
variable was applicable since it did not change between the firefighters onboard if more than
one fatality per crash did occur.
Using Microsoft Excel, the following variables and code options were added to the
spreadsheet:
Incident Type: EMS, Fire Alarm, Flooding, Gas Leak, Investigation, Lines Down, MotorVehicle Crash, Outdoor/Trash fire, Search Detail, Structure Fire, Vehicle Fire,
Water Rescue, Water Rescue, Unknown
Incident Category: Fire, Hazardous Conditions, Investigation, Medical, Rescue, Service
Call, Unknown
Direction: Responding, Returning, Other/Unknown
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Vehicle Type: Ambulance, Brush Truck/Mini Pumper, Engine, Ladder, Personal Vehicle
(Including Bicycle or Motorcycle), Support, Tanker, Utility Vehicle
The narratives were reviewed for each fatality and validated for accuracy. All fatalities that did
not meet the inclusion criteria were removed. All fatalities with narratives lacking detail to code with the
new variables were further reviewed using Google news searches and memorial pages to obtain details.
This yielded 163 fatalities that met this inclusion criteria. Of those fatalities, two fatalities were excluded
because the description of the incident to which they were responding was not given or able to be
obtained. Those crashes were of T. Anderson in 2003, who died in 2018, and of P. A. Nader, who crashed
in 2010 and died in 2013 (U.S. Fire Administration, 2021). It is presumed that the delay between the
crash and their deaths led to a lack of detail in the narrative. Another exclusion was of H. B. Allgood, a
firefighter who was killed while responding to a vehicle accident. Although the spreadsheet listed the
incident and his death as occurring in 2003 (U.S. Fire Administration, 2021), it was revealed that this was
erroneous and actually occurred in 1993. Only six crashes led to the death of multiple firefighters. Each
was a two-fatality crash that occurred during a response. These were coded into six cases using only the
driver’s demographics.
Multiple cases lacked the detail to determine either the type of vehicle or the type of incident
that spurred the trip but were able to be coded with the assistance of news articles or other reports.
One was a 2002 crash that was described as a fire in a lumberyard, lacking enough detail to determine if
it was a structure fire or simply an outdoor fire. A news article from the time described the fire as
involving several buildings and a warehouse, which led to the case being coded as a structure fire
(Uhlinger, 2002). Whenever possible, reports from NIOSH of the incidents were used to validate details.
Another example requiring further research was a 2006 crash that killed a 64-year-old volunteer fire
chief; the summary listed the vehicle only as a “fire apparatus.” A brief news report from the time of the
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incident revealed that the truck was a mini pumper (Goldfeder, 2006). Ultimately, 156 cases met
inclusion criteria and were able to be coded.

National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS)
The second portion of data analysis describes the data, which was drawn from the U.S. Fire
Administration’s National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS) databases. The two pieces of data
obtained were: ratios of various call types and an average number of apparatuses that responded to
each incident type. These statistics allowed the crash cases in the previous section to be appropriately
weighted.
The public data release files were downloaded from the FEMA (2020) website in .zip format for
each year, from 2000 through 2019. Each year contained various databases that examine multiple
aspects of incidents. Only the Basic Incident file from each year was used and was imported into the
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) for manipulation.
Using SPSS, all but four of the 41 variables four were removed (codes in parenthesis): Incident
Type (inc_type), and the counts of fire department apparatus that responded: Suppression Apparatus
(sup_app), EMS Apparatus (ems_app), and Other Apparatus (oth_app). A new variable was then created
for Total Apparatus (tot_app), which was a calculated sum of the three apparatus variables, showing the
total apparatus for each incident.
Next, the Incident Type variable was recoded into broader incident categories. This was
accomplished in SPSS with the recode into new variable function to recode all incidents into the
following categories: 100–199 to “100” (Fire), 200–299 to “200” (Overpressure Explosion, Overheat – No
Fire), 300–399 to “300” (Rescue and EMS Incidents), 400–499 to “499” (Hazardous Condition, No Fire),
500–599 to “500” (Service Calls), 600–699 to “600” (Good Intent Calls), 700–799 to “700” (False Alarms
and False Calls), 800–899 to “800” (Severe Weather and Natural Disaster), and 900-999 to “900” (Special
Incident Type). For a complete reference of the incident types and codes, see Appendix A.
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Next, another variable was created to specifically examine structure fires and emergency
medical calls. A structure fire could be coded as 110 through 119 depending on the exact circumstances
found, and an EMS incident could be coded under various circumstances from 311 through 321.
Therefore, a new variable column was created for structure fires versus EMS incidents (inc_FE) by
recoding the incident type.
Data validation involved excluding cases where no apparatus responded or ones that may have
erroneously high counts of total apparatus. The minimum number accepted would be no less than 1,
and the maximum included was 250. The maximum value of fire apparatus was slightly arbitrary, and
250 emergency vehicles would be exorbitantly high to most at a single incident. However, it is possible
that a large wildfire that lasts days or weeks could involve a number this high, furthermore the Fire
Department of New York had approximately 214 apparatus respond to the 9/11 attacks—one of the
largest structure fire responses in modern history (Flood, 2011). So, 250 was the maximum selected for
inclusion. This was accomplished by using SPSS to select only cases where: 250 >= app_tot AND app_tot
=> 1.
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS

This chapter reveals the findings of the previously described organization methods and analysis.
The first section reports the findings from the fundamental data analysis of firefighter fatal crashes while
responding. This data is presented first without consideration for exposures but simply with the novel
statistic. The second section will add further data consideration to more accurately understand the
effect which call type has on responders’ risk of death and injury from a motor vehicle crash. The third
section will add a broader view to examine trends over the 20-year period.
The data for this study was gathered mostly from the United States Fire Administration’s records
of firefighter fatalities and national incident reports. The information is further enhanced by data and
estimates by the National Fire Protection Association and data by the Unites States’ National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration.

Fatal Crashes While Responding to Calls
After coding and applying the inclusion protocol, 156 cases were listed in a spreadsheet for
analysis. Only 12 (7.7%) of the total cases occurred while returning from an emergency call, with the
remaining 144 (92.3%) occurring while en route to an emergency incident. Due to the small number of
cases while returning, analysis of return trips was not performed. Further analysis was performed below
(Figure 4) of the 144 cases where a death of a firefighter occurred due to a crash while responding to an
emergency incident.
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Figure 4
Fatal Firefighter Crash Cases
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The total cases were grouped by year and are displayed in Figure 4. This line graph shows a 20year high occurring in 2007 of 17 fatal crashes, which killed 18 firefighters. The lowest year for fatal
response crashes was 2015, with one case that killed two firefighters. The trend line shows a decreasing
trend with a slope of -0.3699 over the 20-year period and an apparent overall decrease starting in 2009.
The mean case per year over the entire period was 7.2 cases per year, with the first decade noticeably
higher at 9.7 cases per year compared to 2.3 cases per year for the second 10-year period.

Responses by Nature of Call
Table 1 shows the cases parsed into the broadest nine categories of NFIRS’ coding series. Within
these cases, over half were while responding to a fire-type incident, while the second-most common
cases were en route to an emergency medical or rescue-type incident. Other incident types were largely
less common, with service-type calls and fire alarms. There were no cases while responding to 200-,
800-, or 900-series incidents. The fire category was parsed into two subcategories: structure fires and
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other fires. Similarly, the rescue and EMS category was separated into emergency medical incidents
(EMS) and rescue incidents.

Table 1
Crash Cases by NFIRS Incident Category
Incident category (NFIRS series)
Fire (100)
Structure Fires (110-123)
Other fires
Rescue and EMS Incidents (300)
EMS Incidents (311-321)
Rescue Incidents (332-381)
Hazardous Condition, No Fire (400)
Service Call (500)
Good Intent Call (600)
False Alarms and False Calls (700)

(N)
80
50
30
53
15
38
2
1
2
6

%
55.56%
34.72%
20.83%
36.81%
10.42%
26.39%
1.39%
0.69%
1.39%
4.17%

Table 2 further divides the cases that occurred while responding to fires (100-series) and
emergency medical and rescues (300-series) into more specific subcategories following the NFIRS coding
structure. In the fire category, we were able to further define the cases into four subcategories:
structure-fire incidents (110-123 series), mobile-property fires (130-series), wildland/brush fires (140series), and other-fire types (150-series). Similarly, within the 300-series of EMS and Rescue Incidents,
we were able to separate emergency-medical calls (321 incidents) from rescue incidents (332-381).

41

Table 2
Crash Cases by NFIRS Incident Type
Incident type (NFIRS code)

(N)

%

50
24
4
2

34.72%
16.67%
2.78%
1.39%

34
15
4
11

23.61%
10.42%
2.78%
7.64%

Fire
Structure Fire
Wildland/Brush Fire
Mobile-Property Fires
Other Fire Type
EMS/ Rescue
Motor-Vehicle Crashes
Emergency Medical Calls
Other-Rescue Incidents
All other incidents a
a

Includes the remaining combined 400-, 500-, 600-, and 700-series cases as described in Table 1.

Vehicles and Occupants
The demographics, including age and rank of the fatalities, were not necessarily useful since
they may or may not represent the driver of the vehicle. However, there were other variables that
seemed to reveal trends. The number of vehicles involved in each case was coded from the narrative
data, and 99 (68.75%) of the cases involved a single vehicle, and 45 cases (31.25%) involving multiple
vehicles. Within the multiple-vehicle crashes, three hit another fire apparatus, two impacted a law
enforcement vehicle, and two involved trains.
The type of vehicle in which the firefighter fatality occurred was coded as a variable from the
narratives. The most common type of vehicle in which a fatality occurred was a personally owned
vehicle. The personal vehicles were made up of varying types, including passenger cars, pickup trucks,
motorcycles, and one ATV. The remaining vehicle types were fire department apparatus. Utility vehicles
were either SUVs or pickup trucks with minimal modifications, often used as command vehicles. Aerial
apparatus is any fire-fighting truck with a permanently attached ladder or elevated waterway. One
apparatus fell in the support category, which was an air-supply truck.
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There were 117 cases that killed the driver. The demographics of the driver’s sex were coded
from the narrative data and found to be 110 males (94%) and seven female drivers (5%). Crashes were
more common among single-occupant vehicles as well, with 101 (70%) of the cases involving a lone
driver in the responding vehicle, and 43 (29.9%) of the cases having more than one occupant in the
firefighter’s vehicle. The duty status of the cases revealed that 122 (84.7%) of the cases involved
volunteer firefighters. The duty of the remaining cases consisted of 16 (11.1%) full-time career
firefighters and only six cases (4.2%) involving part-time or paid-per-call firefighters. Most crashes (138,
95.8%) caused only a single firefighter fatality, with six (4.2%) leading to the death of more than one
firefighter. The vehicle type most involved in these incidents was personal vehicles, with the most
common fire apparatus being tankers and engines (Table 3). The single support apparatus was a mobile
air-supply apparatus.

Table 3
Crash Cases by Vehicle Type
Vehicle type
Personally owned vehicles (POV)
Tankers a
Engines
Utility
Brush truck/ mini pumper
Ambulance
Aerial apparatus
Support apparatus

(N)
68
32
21
11
6
3
2
1

%
47.22%
22.22%
14.58%
7.64%
4.17
2.08%
1.39%
0.69%

a

Tankers were defined as any fire apparatus that carried 1000 gallons or more, regardless of their use
as a pumper.

Controlling Variables of Exposure
While the previous section included the fundamental and unique portion of data presented by
the current study, it does not accurately describe the risk that firefighters encounter when responding
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to a call. Since there is great variability between rates of responses between incident types, we will now
focus on scoring the incidence rates with consideration for exposure based on the average proportion of
responses to that type of incident. Secondly, we will consider the average number of apparatuses that
typically respond to each type of incident for each year.
Response Types. The first analysis of the NFIRS data is presented in Table 4. This table took the
number of incidents reported for each series, divided by the total number of incidents reported for that
year. This provided a percentage representing the proportion of responses for each type of incident for
the given year. The count of responses for each incident type for each year was summed and divided by
the total responses for the available years. This yielded an overall average that considered variance
between years of reporting. Table 4 shows a summary of the averages of the ratios of response rates to
the various incident types by U.S. fire departments through all years. This distribution of calls was
sourced from the NFIRS databases. It is important to note that the years 2004 to 2013 only included
incident reports from call types 100, 400, 500, and 600, and therefore were excluded from the averages
in Table 4. To consider changes in responses over years, averages were created by summing each year’s
incident counts/total incident sum.

Table 4
Ratio of Responses by Incident Type
Response type (NFIRS series)
Fire (100)
Overpressure, Rupture, No Fire (200)
Rescue and EMS incidents (300)
Hazardous Condition, No Fire (400)
Service Call (500)
Good Intent Call (600)
False Alarms and False Calls (700)
Severe Weather (800)
Special Incidents (900)

%
5.21%
0.17%
63.32%
3.99%
7.27%
10.19%
8.90%
0.17%
.77%

Note. NFIRS data was incomplete for the years 2004 to 2013, lacking certain incident types: see Appendix B.
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Three types of specific incidents were examined that fall within subcategories of the above
incident types. Those were structure fires, EMS calls (nonrescue), and rescue incidents. The rescue
incidents and EMS incidents both make up the total of the 300-series “Rescue and EMS Incidents” within
the NFIRS database, with EMS responses accounting for the largest incident type consistently at 52.20%
of the total responses. Within the “Fire” series of incidents, structure-fire responses only made up 2.22%
of the total responses, with the trend declining both in the proportion of fires as well as the count of
fires responded to.
Response Intensity. The second consideration for properly weighing exposure is the number of
vehicles per response. Since different types of emergencies require varying extents of resources, a
consideration was given for the average number of fire department vehicles which typically responded
to each type of incident. Using the same NFIRS database, the average number of vehicles per incident
was calculated in Table 5. There was little variability of how many vehicles responded to each incident
type between years. Again, structure fires are counted within the averages in the broad “Fire” category,
and the EMS and Rescue Incidents were averaged separately and collectively.
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Table 5
Mean Vehicles per Incident
Response type (NFIRS series)
Fire (100)
Structure Fires (110–123)
Other Fires (130–173)
Overpressure, Rupture, No Fire (200)
Rescue and EMS Incidents (300)
EMS Incidents (311–321)
Rescue Incidents (322–381)
Hazardous Condition, No Fire (400)
Service Call (500)
Good Intent Call (600)
False Alarms and False Calls (700)
Severe Weather (800)
Special Incidents (900)

x̅
3.32
4.46
2.52
3.23
1.64
1.56
2.00
2.27
1.59
1.96
2.45
2.11
1.55

Crashes weighted by exposure
We now bring together all the data to present probabilities of fatal crashes for responses for
each incident type. Using the incidence rates of cases in the first part of this chapter and the exposure
ratios for each incident type, we calculated probabilities of a fatal crash during response for each
incident type and subtype described above.
Trends in call proportions of fire departments evolved during this time, with less proportions of
fires but increases in total calls. To manage the missing sections of data from the NFIRS databases,
missing data for each category was interpolated using a linear prediction function within Excel. The
interpolated proportion of responses was completed for all the missing data years.
The interpolated and real response proportions were then multiplied by the estimated total
responses for that year using the annual total responses estimated by the National Fire Protection
Association (NFPA). This yielded a reliable estimate for the actual number of responses to each incident
type for each year. The purpose for this method was to account for the gradual increase in total
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responses nationwide over the 20-year period. The yielded counts then represented a reliable estimate
of actual responses, parsed using the NFIRS coding system.
Using the response estimates for each type, we then were able to multiply each year’s response
counts by the average number of apparatuses, yielding an average exposure rate for each incident type
for each year. One exposure represents one fire department motor vehicle (fire apparatus) driving to an
incident. Since these were rather large numbers, they are presented in scientific notation and rounded
in the second column of Table 6. A more complete breakdown is shown in Appendix C.
The combination of these datasets allowed comparison of the risk of being involved in a fatal
crash while responding to each incident type to the average risk while responding to all incident types.
This comparison was performed in two ways. First, we calculated the relative crash risk, found in Table
6. The relative crash risk compares the risk of a fatal crash while responding to a particular incident type
to the risk of all incident types combined. Equation 1 shows how the relative crash risk ratio was
calculated for each response type which was calculated for each incident type, where 𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑠 𝑟 is the
number of fatal crash cases for that incident type, and 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑟 is the number of exposures for that
incident type.
𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑟 ÷ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑟

𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = (𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 − 𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑟 ) ÷ (𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 − 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑟 )

(1)

The second analysis created a crash incidence ratio (CIR). This statistic is like the crash risk ratio, except
it compares risk ratios of a single incident type relative to all the remaining crash ratios. The difference is
in the exclusion of the measured rate from the denominator, as demonstrated in equation 2. This
incidence ratio listed in Table 6 allows more accurate comparison between two single categories.

𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =

𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑟 ÷ 𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑟 ÷ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
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(2)

Table 6. Crash Risk Ratios
Comparison of Risk by Response Type
Incident typer
Fires
Structure Fires*
Other Fires*
Overpressure
Rescue and EMS Incidents
(all)
EMS Calls*
Rescue Incidents*
Hazardous Condition
Service Call
Good Intent Calls
False Alarms
Severe Weather
Special incidents
Total

Exposuresr x104

Crashes

Crash incidence ratio

Relative crash risk

12530
7366
5164
388
55581

80
50
30
-53

4.69
4.99
4.27
-0.70

9.31
7.11
5.13
--

43313
12264
6053
6320
10571
13572
203
629
105061

15
34
2
1
2
6
--144

0.25
2.04
0.24
0.12
0.14
0.32
---

0.53
2.36
0.17
0.23
0.11
0.13
0.30
---

* Subcategories are included in the primary series above them.

Trends Over Time
Since each year was evaluated individually to account for accurate weighting, a trend line was
able to be yielded for the fatal crashes. A steady decline in the slope over the 20-year period was
demonstrated in Figure 4. To get a better understanding of the cases over time, two other databases
were used to create tables during the same 20-year period. The intent of adding these tables was to
consider whether all crashes involving fire apparatus are declining or just those that kill firefighters. The
first database used was the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s (NHTSA) annual fatal crash
statistics (National Center for Statistics and Analysis, 2021). While these datasets do not provide crash
incidence rates, they do provide the rates of fatalities of the emergency vehicle occupants and
nonoccupants in fatal crashes. The data also differentiates if the emergency vehicle was driving in
emergency mode, with lights and sirens in operation. It is important to note that the NHTSA describes
these fatal crashes as involving a “Fire Truck,” and it is unclear what they define as a fire truck (National
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Center for Statistics and Analysis, 2021). Given the lower fatality rates than our data found, it seems that
personal vehicles being operated by firefighters during a response were excluded, and perhaps fire
department utility and support vehicles. Similarly, the reports list EMS vehicles only as “Ambulances”
and may not include support or utility vehicles being used in EMS responses.
Figure 5 illustrates the rates of the fatalities from fire apparatus with a trend line and includes
the separate emergency vehicle types for comparison. Each year’s fatality count is a sum of fatalities of
occupants and nonoccupants, which includes people in other vehicles, pedestrians, and bicyclists.
Unfortunately, the NHTSA data does not provide details on each case individually (National Center for
Statistics and Analysis, 2021). However, there is similar decrease in total fatalities with a trend line slope
of -0.2105 for fatalities involving fire trucks, shown in Figure 5. Comparing the fire-truck crash fatalities
to our data from Figure 4, this decreasing trend provides a moderate positive correlation (r = 0.799).

Figure 5
Fatalities From Crashes Involving Emergency Vehicles in Emergency Mode (NHTSA)
80
70

Fataltieis

60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Year
EMS

Fire

Police

49

Linear (Fire)

Figure 6 displays the NHTSA data over the same time for fatalities involving fire trucks,
comparing occupants (people inside the fire vehicle) with nonoccupants (civilians, pedestrians, other
vehicle drivers and passengers, bicyclists, etc.). The intention of this figure is to examine whether
crashes are trending in the same direction for people outside of the fire apparatus. The slope of the
trend line for deaths of occupants (firefighters) is -1.84, while the slope of the trend line for
nonoccupants is -0.08.
Two datasets from NFPA were used to examine the trends over the same time period to
understand if crashes are decreasing or simply becoming less deadly. The NFPA estimates are survey
data, which are weighted and released each year (Campbell & Evarts, 2020). The first estimate, in Figure
6, is of all collisions, including minor crashes, that involved fire department vehicles and personal
vehicles while transporting a firefighter for purposes related to their work as a firefighter. The second
set of estimates in Figure 7 examines injuries from vehicle crashes over the same decades. Neither of
the estimates differentiate between emergency and nonemergency mode.

Figure 6
Nonoccupant Fatalities Involving Fire Trucks in Emergency Mode, 2000–2019 (NHTSA)

18
16
14

Fataltieis

12
10

8
6
4
2
0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Year
Non-Occupant

Occupant

Linear (Non-Occupant)

50

Linear (Occupant)

Lastly, using the same NFPA estimates, we consider the trends of injuries to firefighters from
vehicle crashes. The trends in Figure 8 are a combination of injuries encountered both in response to
and returning from incidents. There is a similar downward trend a downward trend to what is seen in
the previous figures, with a slope of -23.7 for the injuries.

Figure 7

NFPA Vehicle Collisions Involving Firefighters (Campbell & Evarts, 2020)
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Figure 8
NFPA Firefighter Injuries From Vehicle Crashes (Campbell & Evarts, 2020)
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Summary
Chapter four presented multiple findings built upon a novel variable of incident being responded
to in fatal firefighter crashes. The first section presented the raw counts of these crashes, as sorted using
the National Fire Incident Reporting System’s (NFIRS) standard coding method. Among the 144 fatal
crash cases, we found a high rate of fatal firefighter crashes while responding to fires (55.5%) and
EMS/Rescue Incidents (36.8%).
Next, the results for the exposure rates were presented. To find the exposure, we used
proportions of responses and the average number of responding vehicles from the NFIRS database,
interpolating for missing years. The NFIRS ratios of responses were then applied to the total response
estimates from the National Fire Protection Association’s (NFPA’s) annual estimates. For each year, the
average number of fire vehicles (apparatus) responding to each incident type was multiplied by the
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number of responses for that incident type. The product of these calculations provided a seemingly
reliable exposure for each incident type in each year of the study.
The rates of crashes were then factored using the consideration of exposure. Two methods of
analysis were completed to measure the risk relative to all responses, and risk between response types.
The same method was also applied to three subcategories of responses, with the highest apparent risk
when responding to structure fires.
Lastly, trends over time were considered. Estimates created by the NFPA were presented to
compare to our new data over time. These estimates all showed a steady reduction in severity of
crashes, as well as injuries related to vehicle crashes among firefighters.
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION

Chapter Four presented the findings of the current study, illustrating the impact that the type of
call has on firefighters, using fatal crash incidents as the measure. Now we will focus on interpreting this
data and discussing its implications. This discussion will follow the same logical order as the last chapter,
building upon the results. We will then discuss the explanation of the exploratory findings, how the data
led to their addition, and their potential meanings. And lastly, the limitations of this study are presented.

Crash Cases
The basis of the current study required coding national historic data using the novel variable of
the nature of emergency being responded to. Other variables were also coded for more exploratory
data to be obtained and discussed here.

Direction of Travel
The first point that is most apparent is the ratio of fatal crash cases during response compared
to returning. With 144 cases during response to an incident, and only 12 during the mirrored return trip,
there is an apparent 12-times higher risk during the response phase compared to the nonurgent driving
back to station. Considering each response necessitates an equal-distanced, opposite-direction return
trip, the exposure should be nearly identical in either direction, with the only variable being the urgency
of the response phase. This is a 12-times higher incidence rate of fatal crashes during emergency
response. This aligns with Becker et al.’s (2003) findings from the previous decade, as well as Donoughe
et al.’s (2012) work overlapping the first half of years from our study: While responding to an incident is
a significantly more hazardous time to be in a vehicle.
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Demographics and Vehicles
As a small exploratory addition from the fatality narratives, we coded seven additional variables
of each crash case, including the duty status, sex of the driver (if the driver was a fatality), the type of
vehicle, the number of vehicles involved, the number of occupants in the firefighter’s vehicle (if known),
the number of fatalities in the firefighter’s vehicle, and the fatality’s riding positions.
Duty Status. The duty status counts identified whether the firefighters were full-time
professionals, volunteers, paid part time, or paid per call. The paid-per-call and the part-time cases were
combined and made up only six (4.2%) of the total, with 122 (84.7%) involving volunteers, and the
remaining 16 (11.1%) involving career firefighters. This statistic may seem in line, since the NFPA
estimates that 66% of the firefighters in the United States are volunteers (Campbell & Evarts, 2020). The
NFPA report combines the part-time firefighters with the volunteers, so to align with the population, we
now combine our data to show 128 cases (88.9%) involving volunteers or part-time firefighters.
However, we must again understand the responses by the types of departments. The same report
reveals that career firefighters protect 68% of the U.S. population. Assuming call volume is
proportionate to population, career firefighters respond to about 68% of the total emergencies in the
United States, and likely more since full-time departments are more likely to offer more services, such as
emergency medical care (both transport and nontransport). That makes the crash cases
disproportionately high among volunteer firefighters.
The lower number incidents and the disproportional crash rates encountered by volunteer fire
departments could indicate a stress inoculation, or desensitization by firefighters in full-time
departments. Perhaps exposure to more alarms has a mitigating effect on stress to alarms. This idea is
somewhat reinforced by the observations of Brown and Stickford (2009), with the years’ experience of
career firefighters inversely correlated with the emotional response. In other words, new firefighters
typically display a more aroused state at the time of alarm than more experienced ones. This
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phenomenon could support the idea that there is a yearning and anticipation for the excitement of fires
by firefighters, especially when there are few to be fought. This could be supported by the evidence of
volunteer firefighters committing disproportionately higher rates of arson fires for the excitement (e.g.
Jordan, 2019).
Sex of the Driver. The sex of the driver was able to be obtained from the narratives and from
profiles on the fatalities using the pronouns, names, and photographs to determine the sex of the driver
when it was not otherwise apparent. Of the 144 cases, 117 involved the death of the driver. Of those
117 cases, 110 (96%) were male, and seven (6%) were female. The NFPA’s breakdown of firefighter
demographics lists female firefighters as making up 4% of the career ranks and 11% of the volunteer
ranks nationwide (Evarts & Stein, 2020). All seven of the female drivers in our study were volunteers.
Given the inability to know the sex of the driver of the remining cases, this is likely an insignificant
finding.
Number of Occupants. The number of occupants in the firefighter’s vehicle was coded for each
case. Counting the driver, these ranged from one to five people on board the firefighter’s vehicle. In 101
(70.1%) of the cases, the driver was the sole occupant of the vehicle, with the remaining 43 (29.9%)
having one or more passengers. This could indicate a potential mediating effect that having a passenger
has on the driver. Perhaps if a driver knows they are responsible for another person, it pushes them to
maintain a higher level of care, or perhaps input from passengers to the driver can attenuate the risk.
Vehicle Type. The type of vehicle in which the firefighter was traveling when they died was
coded and reported in Table 3. The most common fire apparatus was tankers (or engines equipped with
water tanks of 1000 gallons or more for this study). This would align with the increased crash risk from
tankers identified by the U.S. Fire Administration (2003) in their targeted publication titled Safe
Operation of Fire Tankers as well as the continued emergency vehicle safety initiatives in 2004 and 2014
that place particular emphasis on tankers. While there are estimates on the total number of each type
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of apparatus in the United States, it would be difficult to estimate actual exposure of each type due to
lack of response data broken down by specific apparatus types. Table 7 shows that all the tanker cases
involved volunteer or part-time firefighters. This is expected since tankers are utilized in more rural
areas, where volunteer fire protection is more common.

Table 7
Duty Status Versus Vehicle Type
Duty
Career
Volunteer/part time
Total

EMS Brush Engine Ladder POV Support Tanker Utility
2
8
2
1
3
1
6
13
67
1
32
8
3
6
21
2
68
1
32
11

Total
16
128
144

Note. Part-time and paid-per-call firefighters were combined with volunteers for these rates.

The overwhelming majority of crashes were not in fire apparatus, but rather in personally
owned vehicles (POVs), making up 68 (47.22%) of the cases. In 62 of the 64 POV crashes, the driver was
the lone occupant. All but one of the POV cases involved volunteer or part-time firefighters. Considering
that most volunteer firefighters respond from their homes or work when summoned, it could be
expected that many personal vehicles would be in operation to transport and staff one firefighting
apparatus. This would increase the exposure of driving POVs disproportionately other fire apparatus and
make this result somewhat expected. Given the high rate of POV crashes over tankers, this leads us to
question if the vehicle type affects risk as much as the variable of the incident type.

Nature of Call During Response
While reviewing the list of incident types related to the fatal crash cases, it quickly becomes
apparent that most of the responses are to fires (55.56%)—specifically, structure fires (34.72%). From an
outsider’s perspective, this would likely seem meaningless, as it could be assumed that the primary job
that firefighters perform is that of fire suppression. And, if so, a third of the crashes occurring while
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responding to a structure fire may seem like a reasonable proportion of crashes. However, when we
learn that during the same time period, fire departments average only 2.22% of their responses to fires,
it shows an astoundingly disproportionate rate of fatal crash cases to these incident types.
Crash cases were coded and categorized using the same system that incidents are reported
within the United States. The NFIRS series allowed us to further break the cases into subcategories as
the details of the incident allowed. Specifically, two categories were chosen that allowed the remaining
cases in the broader series to make up two more sub-categories of cases. Based on the very high rates of
structure fire response cases, we were able to separate the 50 structure fire cases from the 80 cases
that occurred while responding to all fires. This left 30 “Fire-Other” cases. These remaining cases include
responses to wildland fires, vehicle fires, and other miscellaneous incidents where there is fire.
Similarly, we split the NFIRS “EMS and Rescue Incident” series into two subcategories. We
separated the subcategory of cases while responding to EMS calls, which left the remaining cases to
include actual rescue incidents. This separation was made to evaluate what is the most common type of
response in which fire departments make: emergency medical responses. Structural firefighting is
perhaps the image that comes to mind when most people think of firefighters, and firefighters’ basic
training emphasizes structural fire suppression and rescue techniques. But even though that task of
suppressing fire is in their name, most responses by firefighters do not involve fires. Alternatively, while
emergency medical treatment is a separate discipline, it has become the most common incident type to
which firefighters respond. The separation of these two subcategories was done primarily to compare
the most fundamental task in which firefighters are trained structure fires, and the most common task
which firefighters handle: medical calls.

Rates by Exposures
The crash cases provided counts of instances where one or more firefighters died while en
route to a call for service. But to better understand the true distributions, we attempted to control for
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two other moderating variables: the ratio in which departments typically respond to each incident type
and the number of vehicles that typically respond to each incident type. It was uncertain if these aspects
would amplify or potentiate the differences in the counts.
The variance in the average number of response vehicles for incident types was as expected. On
the high end, the subcategory of structure fires had an average of 4.46 vehicles per incident, with EMS
incidents on the opposite end at 1.56 vehicles. This expectation is due to the type of tasks that are
required to mitigate each type of incident. Fires inside of buildings are extremely demanding on both
personnel resources and on apparatus resources, often necessitating many tools, pumps, hoses, and
personnel, which get delivered on a fire apparatus. Surprisingly, the average number of response
vehicles over the 20-year period was relatively unchanged, from 4.92 in 2000 to 4.42 in 2019 on
structure fires. Given the progressive evolution of consensus standards, it was assumed these averages
would have increased some; however, consideration for the actual staffing of each apparatus was
outside the scope of this study. The weighting of the apparatus counts, if used alone, would have almost
certainly explained the differences in the rates of crashes to each incident type.
Perhaps the more significant consideration that affected the results of our study was the
average proportion of responses to each incident type. Structure fires make up over a third of the crash
cases in our study yet are only 2.2% of a typical department’s total responses. This amplified our findings
and made the outlier of fire responses far more drastic than expected.
Comparing the crash incidence ratios, we find that the broad category of fire responses is the
most hazardous. Although fires make up only 11.8% of the vehicle-responses which firefighters were
exposed to, they represented over 55% of the fatal crash cases. Fire responses have the highest
incidence rate over the other remaining response series and indicates that a firefighter is 9.31 times
more likely to be involved in a fatal crash when responding to a fire than to any other type of emergency
incident.
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To better understand these rates, we split the broad categories into subcategories. The fire
category was able to be further parsed into structure fires, and other types of fires. Similarly, the EMS
and Rescue category was split into medical incidents and rescue incidents to measure the difference
where a victim could be trapped versus simply experiencing a medical emergency. Comparing the
structure fire category to the other fires, structure fire responses indicated approximately a 115% higher
risk than other types of fires (comparing the crash risk ratios). Within the EMS and Rescue series, we
note an 800% increase in fatal crash cases when comparing rescues to medical responses. Comparing
the crash risk ratios of these two subcategories we find the most extreme difference between EMS
responses and structure fire responses. This indicates that a firefighter is 19.6 times more likely to be
involved in a fatal crash when responding to a structure fire than to an EMS incident.

Trends Over Time
The trend in Figure 4 shows a noted decrease in fatal crashes over the 20-year period, with the
trend line on a steady decline of nearly 11 cases in 2000, down to an intercept at less than three in 2019.
This led us to question if the decreasing trend of crashes that led to the death of a firefighter indicated a
decrease in crashes or if it just meant the crashes are still occurring but are less fatal.
To accomplish this, there were two separate datasets which were created to simply compare
trends. The first question was whether these cases where a firefighter death occurred during response
align with the trends of all deaths involving emergency vehicles. To obtain this, we referenced annual
reports from the same 20-years to build a table from the NHTSA fatal facts. Figure 5 indicates that there
is a trend of decreasing deaths overall, but Figure 6 more specifically illustrates how these crashes affect
those people outside of the fire apparatus. The trend is considerably different for nonoccupant fatalities
than for occupants of the fire trucks. This indicates that perhaps there is a slight decreasing in the
occurrence of fire apparatus crashes, but that they are also becoming less deadly for firefighters.
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The NFPA data for the same time frame, demonstrated in Figure 7 and Figure 8, show estimates
of crashes and injuries from crashes of firefighters responding and returning. The estimates show a
decline in crash instances, but a more noted decline in injuries from crashes. Both data sources
compared to our data indicate that while there is a moderate decline in crashes of these emergency
vehicles, there is a more significant reduction in the associated injuries and deaths of firefighters.
Unfortunately, the decline in deaths is not as steep for civilians outside of the firefighting apparatus. The
more rapid decline in firefighter deaths and injuries per crash could be explained by better engineering
of safety features such as rollover protection systems and airbags in firefighting apparatus. Additionally,
it could indicate improved use of seat belts by firefighters, reducing the likelihood of a crash becoming
fatal.
A final observation on the trends over time was the apparent drop in fatal cases, which occurred
around 2009. In Figure 4, it appears that while the trend line has continued downward, there is an
overall drop in fatal crash cases starting in 2009. Splitting these into two groups facilitates further
statistical comparison of the trends. The nine years between 2000 and 2008 (M = 10.33, SD = 3.67, n=8,
slope = -0.324) shows a higher rate and slope than the 11 years following (M = 4.63, SD = 2.01, n = 11,
slope = -0.024). This difference was significant, t (18) = 4.41, p < .001. Comparing these trends to the
overall crash estimates in Figure 8, we can assume the cause of the overall decline in fatal cases was not
necessarily related to a drastic reduction in crashes. Therefore, this is presumed to be associated with an
improved culture of safe driving and seat belt use, as well as potential improvements in engineering and
safety features in vehicles. Both could be credited to the U.S. Fire Administration’s first initiative on
vehicle safety that focused on fire tankers, released in 2003. This was followed by a broader emergency
vehicle safety initiative published by FEMA for the USFA in 2004 and revised in 2014 (U.S. Fire
Administration, 2014). Additionally, NFPA standards, which are updated every three to five years, are
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constantly improving safety of emergency vehicle design. However, most of these crashes are in
personal vehicles, which would not be credited to emergency vehicle design features.

Conclusions
This chapter summarized and discussed the findings presented in Chapter Four. From our data,
we can answer both research questions from Chapter Three:
Q1. Are fatal ESVC rates among responding firefighters evenly distributed among all types of
incidents proportional to incident rates?
A1. No, there are significant differences between fatal crash rates depending on the type of
incident the firefighter’s vehicle was responding to.
Q2. When weighted for exposure rates, what incidents have the highest fatal crash rate of
firefighters while responding?
A2. Responses to any type of fire yield a considerably higher rate of crashes than other incident
categories, at 9.31-times higher likelihood of crashing compared to mean risk overall.
Specifically, structure fires pose the highest risk of a fatal crash. When compared to
emergency medical incidents, which is the most common type of response, firefighters
experience a 19.6-times higher likelihood of experiencing a fatal crash.
It was hypothesized that fatal firefighter crashes would be higher for incidents related to “fires” or
“entrapment” compared to other incident types. The data strongly supports that being dispatched to a
fire does increase likelihood of crash. Since we separated the emergency medical calls from the EMS and
Rescue category, the remaining incidents are primarily the ones where a person would be trapped,
whether in a vehicle crash or other type of scenario (excluding trapped by fires). The finding was that
rescue responses pose the next highest risk after responses to fires. Comparing the crash risk ratio of
rescue incidents (2.037) to the EMS incidents (0.254) indicates an eight-times higher risk of fatal crash
over EMS responses.
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CHAPTER 6: LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The previous chapters have presented the problem, the background of research supporting the
research questions, the methods of data collection and analysis, and the results of the current study
with a discussion on what they mean. Chapter Six now presents all known limitations of the work,
followed by a discussion on the implications of the findings and recommendations for future solutions
and research.

Limitations of the Study
The current study relied completely on retrospective data, gathered in a general database. Since
the data was not gathered specifically for the purposes we used them for, it limits the details and
potentially the accuracy of this study. For example, at least four cases required supplemental
information by searching for news articles about the crash to determine the type of incident that they
were responding to when the crash occurred. With these degrees of separation, the reliability of the
news report to use correct terminology to describe the response is understandably questionable. These
incidents that required further information were typically described using generic terms to refer to the
incident, such as “the firefighter was responding to an alarm when their vehicle left the roadway.” The
term “alarm” can be used as a generic term to describe any type of incident in which a responder is
spurred to respond. However, in the fire service, an alarm commonly refers to a report of an activated
fire alarm in a building, but without actual reports of fire or smoke. If the incident was in fact a fire
alarm, for our study it would be coded as an “investigation” since there would be no report of fire.
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Assumptions
The next known limitation is the assumptions on which we rely for the current study. The first
assumption is that the responding firefighter was in fact made aware of the type of incident to which
they were responding. However, this was considered during coding. For example, one incident involving
a bicycle crash in 2002 was excluded because it was explicitly mentioned that the junior firefighter was
not aware of the nature of the call, even though it is apparent that his sense of urgency to get to the fire
station contributed to him riding his bike directly into the path of a car. Similarly, it is assumed that the
rates of incidents to which departments are dispatched is the same as what departments find and report
to NFIRS. While it is understood that emergency dispatchers rely on information they obtain from 911
call reporters, who are typically untrained bystanders, what is reported can often be inaccurate
compared to the type of incident that is found. In other words, perhaps a 911 caller may call to report a
fire alarm being activated in a building. A fire department then gets dispatched using the local protocols,
that delegate the number and types of units needed for a fire-alarm type of incident. If the firefighters
arrive and find that there is in fact a fire in the building which caused the alarm, then the report would
be categorized as a fire rather than as an investigation. However, although this is not an uncommon
occurrence, it was a minimal concern, since these discrepancies would occur in both directions to
normalize the data. There may just as often be someone who calls to report a structure fire, which is
dispatched as such. Then the firefighters arrive to find burnt food with no actual fire present. That
incident would then be recorded in NFIRS as a false alarm. The same could apply to vehicle crashes
where there is suspected injuries or entrapment turning out to be minor accidents with no injuries.
Again, it is assumed that these types of occurrences would all be countered and normalized out in the
large dataset that was used.
Another imitation is the assumption that the call type caused the increased emotional arousal.
There are only limited data on certain call types to determine the physiological responses of firefighters
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to dispatch information for various types of incidents. There are no studies that code the incidents as we
did and assessed the physiological signs based on this system of parsing the incidents. There is always
the potential for a confounding variable which was not considered.

Multiple Datasets
There are inherent limitations to drawing from multiple datasets; however, the method in which
the study did so would seem to utilize each appropriately to allow the relationship between them. The
NFIRS data contains actual real reports from incidents that are voluntarily reported. Participation in the
early part of this century was considerably less than what it was after 2010. However, the data that we
extracted from these reports was simply looking for averages of apparatus responses, and ratios of call
distributions. Since the voluntary reporting to NFIRS increased significantly over the 20-year period, it
was not a reliable count of total response nationwide for this time period. To correct for the increase in
participation, we utilized the NFPA estimates of total responses, which are more reliable for that specific
statistic. The NFPA statistics couldn’t not be utilized otherwise for a ratio of call distribution, however,
due to the method that they used to parse their incident types.
A similar limitation is the increase in EMS services that U.S. fire departments offer. During the
late 1990s, the International Association of Fire Fighters (1997), which represents most career U.S.
firefighters, strongly advocated for fire department-based EMS programs. This was partly due to the
decrease in fires occurring, and partly due to the ability of the fire service to offer this service. So, during
the 20-year period that this study covers, many fire departments across the United States began
offering some form of emergency medical services. This drastically changed the ratios of calls to which
the fire service responded. Unfortunately, the years of 2004 through 2013 only had partial records
available from the NFIRS databases. This was due to the inability to fit the entire database on a CD-rom
drive for storage and distribution during that time. Therefore, the data for call distribution was
interpolated using a linear regression of the years in which they were available. This is described as a
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limitation since the slow increase of the proportion of EMS-type calls during these 10 years may not
have been actually linear. Fortunately, if this were the case, this likely would have only slightly skewed
the results.

Vehicle Limitations
There were two considerations that could have improved the validity of this study. The first is
the aspect of personal vehicles. It was surprising that nearly half of all of the cases in this study occurred
in personal vehicles. Unfortunately, there is no way to accurately count the number of personal vehicles
that are involved in a volunteer fire department’s response. It is also unclear whether volunteer fire
departments count the POVs as auxiliary apparatus on their NFIRS reports. Regardless, it is expected
that there is a ratio of POVs to fire apparatus, which would be similar for any type of incident. If it takes
four POVs to transport firefighters to their station to staff one engine for a small incident, then the same
ratio would be expected to be present for larger incidents. Therefore, its assumed that this impact
would be negligible when comparing exposure rates of incident types to each other.
A second limitation is the validation of the NFIRS data regarding average vehicles responding per
incident type. Statistical Package for the Social Sciences software was used to filter any incident that had
less than one vehicle respond, or more than 250 vehicles respond. This number was somewhat arbitrary
and potentially far higher than it needed to be. It is expected that many of the reports that listed
double-digit numbers of apparatus response from one department were likely done so in error. This
potential limitation would be on the conservative side of the estimates and would likely affect all
incident types equally, and consequently cancel each other out across such a large dataset.
A final limitation worth discussing is the assumption that all accidents are fundamentally
preventable, and a truly defensive driver could in some way prevent the accident or prevent the death.
However, it is understood that this may not be realistic. For example, one 2004 case involved a
firefighter whose vehicle was impacted in the rear by a responding police officer at a high rate of speed.
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The fault of the impact was clearly on the police officer; however, the firefighter was not wearing a seat
belt, the use of which may have saved his life. And that decision to not buckle his seat belt may have
been influenced by the acute stress and urgency to arrive at the scene at all costs. Additionally, two
cases involved a fire apparatus driver who was listed as having alcohol in their bloodstream at the time
of the crash. While it could be argued that those cases should be excluded, it can be countered that the
potential influence of the urgency and acute stress of the dispatch enticed those drivers to choose to
respond when they may have otherwise not driven.

Implications and Recommendations
The U.S. Fire Administration and the International Association of Fire Chiefs advocate for
“emergency service organizations to concentrate on implementing and demonstrating an effective and
measurable model to improve situational awareness of all responders” (U.S. Fire Administration, 2015,
p. 14). One way that situational awareness is lost is through acute stress, and we know that this stress is
potentiated by varying incident dispatches, and that this dispatch information can affect a responder’s
risk during response. The findings of this study have a broad impact. All emergency responders need to
understand how their own sense of urgency to respond affects their ability to function safely.
Firstly, inclusion of this information in emergency vehicle driver training may help increase
awareness of the effect. Simply knowing that humans are hindered by acute emotional stress, and that
this type of stress occurs more for certain dispatches and responses, could itself potentially decrease
fatalities of responders and civilians, as well as the countless injuries and costs associated with
emergency service vehicle crashes.
While the knowledge of the hindrances from acute stress may improve responders’ abilities, other
solutions should be considered to reduce the arousal of emergency dispatches. One well-supported
method of controlling acute stress is cross-training. Various studies presented by NASA demonstrated
positive reduction in acute stress among flight crews by cross training each person on the others’ duties
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and responsibilities (Dismukes, Goldsmith, & Kochan, 2015). This is an area which potential future
research could examine the applicability to fire and emergency services. However, since most of our
cases occurred while the operator was alone in the vehicle, an alternative solution for stress
management may be better adapted.
A stress management technique that allows a person to control their stress levels through specific
breathing techniques seems promising for our application. Box breathing, which has been used by the
military, law enforcement, and emergency medical staff to control the physiological effects of acute
stress, seems reasonable and easy to learn and implement (Lauria et al., 2017). This technique simply
requires the person to inhale deeply over four seconds, hold the breath for four seconds, exhale deeply
over four seconds, wait four seconds, then repeat (Bernier et al., 2011). This practice can reduce a
person’s heart rate and in turn their physiological response to the stressful stimuli, thus improving
performance.
An alternative solution has already been implemented in aeromedical services. Dispatchers for
aeromedical flights are encouraged by the Federal Aviation Administration to withhold the details of the
patient or incident to which the flight is responding until the aircrew makes the decision to fly and are
safely airborne (Federal Aviation Administration, 2015). Withholding details reduces the chances of a
sense of urgency, which could affect the pilot’s judgment or ability to safely operate the aircraft. For
example, a flight crew who is dispatched to an injured child may be enticed to fly in inclement weather,
even though the risk is not prudent to do so. Or, the crew may skip over critical safety checks prior to
takeoff, increasing the risk of a crash. A similar solution could allow fire departments, emergency
medical services, and police officers to be initially only dispatched to an address with no further
modifiers or details of the incident until the unit is approaching the scene. Alternatively, the details of
the dispatch could be withheld from the driver of the vehicle, and only provided to the incident
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commander via a digital messaging system, allowing the driver to focus only on arriving safely to the
emergency scene, without the sense of urgency triggered by the details.

Future Research
As does most research, this study led to more questions and opportunities to better study and
understand this phenomenon in this population. The first topic of future research would be to perform a
similar analysis on either law-enforcement officers or EMS crashes during response. Although it is likely
that these professions also have similar disproportionate rates of crashes correlated with certain types
of incidents. To better solidify the link between dispatch information, the driver’s psychophysiological
response, and the driving performed, experiments could be performed easily using a driving simulator to
compare the urgency participants display to different simulated dispatches. These could be compared to
the drastic differences found within the fire service and offer insight on the human factors which
influence these other professions.
The U.S. Fire Administration has emphasized tanker trucks as a particularly high-risk due to the mass
of the vehicle, its propensity for rollover, and the higher-than-average fatalities which these crashes
yield. But since personal vehicle crashes far outweigh the crashes of tanker trucks, and the current study
shows the highest risk during responses to fires, we pose two questions: Is the tanker really the root of
the problem? Or is it the fact that tankers are perhaps the least versatile type of fire apparatus, with
their responses typically only necessitated by fire incidents.
A trend was observed while reviewing firefighter fatalities through these two decades. It seemed
that a large majority of heart attacks and strokes occurred en route to a fire, and many of those were
while driving a vehicle. The trends of these stress-related medical events appeared to correlate similarly
to our study, with a high rate of occurrences while responding to a fire but prior to performing the
physically demanding work on scene. It was also noted that many of these occurred in chiefs or incident
commanders, who typically perform less physically demanding work than other fire-ground positions. A
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similar study could be performed with these cases, coding the incident that spurred the psychological
stress. As previous research on cardiac events of firefighters has identified many predictors of these
events, there has only been variables of the type of work being performed, such as suppression or
driving (Geibe et al., 2007). The same independent variable used in the current study could be examined
in firefighter stress-related medical events as a possible predictor.
The acute stress from certain dispatches likely does not stop with emergency driving. It likely
continues throughout the incident, which may lead to skewed judgment and increased risk-taking by
responders. If an incident commander falls victim to the excitement of a perceived urgent or large-scale
event, that commander may choose strategies that they may otherwise know exceed the risk-versusreward matrix that modern firefighters are trained to consider. An evaluation of this could use a
simulation that allows firefighters or other first responders to experience a stimulus of perceived urgent
dispatches followed by a scenario where a tactical decision must be made, compared to the same
scenario with a less urgent dispatch.
This leads to yet another question and potential area of research: If first responders prioritize
urgency to certain emergencies over others (either consciously or subconsciously), does the public have
the same perception? Would an average citizen having an emergency have an expectation of higher
urgency if their barn is on fire versus if their family member is struggling to breathe? It would also be
interesting to learn if responders consciously prioritize certain emergencies over others based on the
dispatch information. This type of research could imaginably be performed with a simple survey
instrument.
Similarly, the question is posed of justification. There is risk in everything and realistically a rate of
zero crashes or injuries is not reasonably possible. Regardless, we must try to reduce these rates
whenever we have the resources to do so. Considering this study’s data and the type of life-saving work
which first responders perform poses the question: Is it justified? Keeping in mind that the current
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study’s 144 crashes represent 163 firefighter deaths, an estimated 1,630 civilian deaths, nearly 20,000
firefighter injuries, and even more civilian injuries, deaths, and property damage: Is this amount of
collateral damage justified compared to the lives and property saved? Research has been carried out on
the justification of ambulance responses using lights and sirens to compare the response times to the
outcome of the patient (Pons et al., 2005). Accordingly, Jarvis et al. (2020) examined what actually
happens during those first few minutes upon arrival of an ambulance to the scene of a medical
emergency and found that less than 7% of incidents required immediate life-saving interventions. A
similar study could be performed that examines response times of firefighters, as well as the first actions
performed, to determine if any justification exists for this increased risk during responses to fires.
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APPENDIX A - NFIRS Incident Types
NFIRS Incident Types (FEMA, 2015, pp. 22–28)
100-Series
11x
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
12x
121
122
123
120
13x
131
132
133
134
135
136
137

Fire
Structure fire
Building fire. Excludes confined fires (113–118
Fire in structure, other than in a building. Included are fires on or in piers, quays, or pilings: tunnels or under- ground connecting structures; bridges, trestles, or
overhead elevated structures; transformers, power or utility vaults or equipment; fences; and tents.
Cooking fire involving the contents of a cooking vessel without fire extension beyond the vessel.
Chimney or flue fire originating in and confined to a chimney or flue. Excludes fires that extend beyond the chimney (111 or 112).
Incinerator overload or malfunction, but flames cause no damage outside the incinerator.
Fuel burner/boiler, delayed ignition, or malfunction, where flames cause no damage outside the fire box.
Commercial compactor fire, confined to contents of compactor. Excluded are home trash compactors.
Trash or rubbish fire in a structure, with no flame damage to structure or its contents.
Fire in mobile property used as a fixed structure. Includes mobile homes, motor homes, camping trailers.
Fire in mobile home used as a fixed residence. Includes mobile homes when not in transit and used as a structure for residential purposes; and manufactured
homes built on a permanent chassis.
Fire in a motor home, camper, or recreational vehicle when used as a structure. Includes motor homes when not in transit and used as a structure for residential
purposes.
Fire in a portable building, when used at a fixed location. Includes portable buildings used for commerce, industry, or education and trailers used for commercial
purposes.
Fire in mobile property used as a fixed structure, other.
Mobile property (vehicle) fire. Excludes mobile properties used as a structure (120 series). If a vehicle fire occurs on a bridge and does not damage the bridge,
it should be classified as a vehicle fire.
Passenger vehicle fire. Includes any motorized passenger vehicle, other than a motor home (136) (e.g., pickup trucks, sport utility vehicles, buses).
Road freight or transport vehicle fire. Includes commercial freight hauling vehicles and contractor vans or trucks. Examples are moving trucks, plumber vans, and
delivery trucks.
Rail vehicle fire. Includes all rail cars, including intermodal containers and passenger cars that are mounted on a rail car.
Water vehicle fire. Includes boats, barges, hovercraft, and all other vehicles designed for navigation on water.
Aircraft fire. Includes fires originating in or on an aircraft, regardless of use.
Self-propelled motor home or recreational vehicle. Includes only self-propelled motor homes or recreational vehicles when being used in a transport mode.
Excludes those used for normal residential use (122).
Camper or recreational vehicle (RV) fire, not self-propelled. Includes trailers. Excludes RVs on blocks or used regularly as a fixed building (122) and the vehicle
towing the camper or RV or the campers mounted on pickups (131)
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138
130
14x
141

142
143
140
15x
151
152
153
154

16x
161
162
163
164
160
17x
171
172
173
170
10x
100

200-Series
21x
211
212
213
210
22x

Off-road vehicle or heavy equipment fire. Includes dirt bikes, specialty off-road vehicles, earth-moving equipment (bulldozers), and farm equipment.
Mobile property (vehicle) fire, other.
Natural vegetation fire. Excludes crops or plants under cultivation (see 170 series).
Forest, woods, or wildland fire. Includes fires involving vegetative fuels, other than prescribed fire (632), that occur in an area in which development is essentially
nonexistent, except for roads, railroads, power lines, and the like. Also includes forests managed for lumber production and fires involving elevated fuels such as
tree branches and crowns. Excludes areas in cultivation for agricultural purposes such as tree farms or crops (17x series).
Brush or brush-and-grass mixture fire. Includes ground fuels lying on or immediately above the ground such as duff, roots, dead leaves, fine dead wood, and
downed logs.
Grass fire. Includes fire confined to area characterized by grass ground cover, with little or no involvement of other ground fuels; otherwise, see 142.
Natural vegetation fire, other.
Outside rubbish fire. Includes all rubbish fires outside a structure or vehicle.
Outside rubbish, trash, or waste fire not included in 152–155. Excludes outside rubbish fires in a container or receptacle (154).
Garbage dump or sanitary landfill fire.
Construction or demolition landfill fire.
Dumpster or other outside trash receptacle fire. Includes waste material from manufacturing or other production processes. Excludes materials that are not
rubbish or have salvage value (161 or 162).
155 Outside stationary compactor or compacted trash fire. Includes fires where the only material burning is rubbish. Excludes fires where the compactor is
damaged (162).
150 Outside rubbish fire, other.
Special outside fire. Includes outside fires with definable value. Excludes crops and orchards (170 series).
Outside storage fire on residential or commercial/industrial property, not rubbish. Includes recyclable materials at drop-off points.
Outside equipment fire. Includes outside trash compactors, outside HVAC units, and irrigation pumps. Excludes special structures (110 series) and mobile
construction equipment (130 series).
Outside gas or vapor combustion explosion without sustained fire.
Outside mailbox fire. Includes drop-off boxes for delivery services.
Special outside fire, other.
Cultivated vegetation, crop fire
Cultivated grain or crop fire. Includes fires involving corn, wheat, soybeans, rice, and other plants before harvest.
Cultivated orchard or vineyard fire.
Cultivated trees or nursery stock fire. Includes fires involving Christmas tree farms and plants under cultivation for transport off-site for ornamental use.
Cultivated vegetation, crop fire, other.
Fire, other
Fire, other.

Overpressure Rupture, Explosion, Overheat (No Fire). Excludes steam mistaken for smoke.
Overpressure rupture from steam (no ensuing fire)
Overpressure rupture of steam pipe or pipeline.
Overpressure rupture of steam boiler.
Overpressure rupture of pressure or process vessel from steam.
Overpressure rupture from steam, other.
Overpressure rupture from air or gas (no ensuing fire). Excludes steam or water vapor.
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221
222
223
220
23x
231
24x
241
242
243
244
240
25x
251
20x
200

300-Series
31x
311
32x
321
322
323
324
320
33x
331
34x
341
342
343
340
35x
351
353

Overpressure rupture of air or gas pipe or pipeline.
Overpressure rupture of boiler from air or gas. Excludes steam-related overpressure ruptures
Overpressure rupture of pressure or process vessel from air or gas, not steam.
Overpressure rupture from air or gas, other.
Overpressure rupture from chemical reaction (no ensuing fire).
Overpressure rupture of pressure or process vessel from a chemical reaction.
Explosion (no fire)
Munitions or bomb explosion (no fire). Includes explosions involving military ordnance, dynamite, nitroglycerin, plastic explosives, propellants, and similar agents
with a UN classification 1.1 or 1.3. Includes primary and secondary high explosives.
Blasting agent explosion (no fire). Includes ammonium nitrate and fuel oil (ANFO) mixtures and explosives with a UN Classification 1.5 (also known as blasting
agents).
Fireworks explosion (no fire). Includes all classes of fireworks.
Dust explosion (no fire).
Explosion (no fire), other.
Excessive heat, scorch burns with no ignition
Excessive heat, overheat scorch burns with no ignition. Excludes lightning strikes with no ensuing fire (814).
Overpressure rupture, explosion, overheat, other
Overpressure rupture, explosion, overheat, other.

Rescue and Emergency Medical Service Incident
Medical assist
Medical assist. Includes incidents where medical assistance is provided to another group/agency that has primary EMS responsibility. (Example, providing
assistance to another agency-assisting EMS with moving a heavy patient.)
Emergency medical service incident
EMS call. Includes calls when the patient refuses treatment. Excludes vehicle accident with injury (322) and pedestrian struck (323).
Motor vehicle accident with injuries. Includes collision with other vehicle, fixed objects, or loss of control resulting in leaving the roadway.
Motor vehicle/pedestrian accident (MV Ped). Includes any motor vehicle accident involving a pedestrian injury.
Motor vehicle accident with no injuries.
Emergency medical service incident, other.
Lock-In
Lock-in. Includes opening locked vehicles and gaining entry to locked areas for access by caretakers or rescu- ers, such as a child locked in a bathroom. Excludes
lock-outs (511).
Search for lost person
Search for person on land. Includes lost hikers and children, even where there is an incidental search of local bodies of water, such as a creek or river.
Search for person in water. Includes shoreline searches incidental to a reported drowning call.
Search for person underground. Includes caves, mines, tunnels, and the like.
Search for lost person, other.
Extrication, rescue
Extrication of victim(s) from building or structure, such as a building collapse. Excludes high-angle rescue (356).352 Extrication of victim(s) from vehicle. Includes
rescues from vehicles hanging off a bridge or cliff.
Removal of victim(s) from stalled elevator.
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354
355
356
357
350
36x
361
362
363
364
365
360
37x
371
372
370
38x
381
30x
300

400-Series
41x
411
412
413
410
42x
421
422
423
424
420
43x
431
430
44x
441
442
443

Trench/Below-grade rescue.
Confined space rescue. Includes rescues from the interiors of tanks, including areas with potential for hazard- ous atmospheres such as silos, wells, and tunnels.
High-angle rescue. Includes rope rescue and rescues off of structures.
Extrication of victim(s) from machinery. Includes extrication from farm or industrial equipment.
Extrication, rescue, other.
Water and ice-related rescue
Swimming/Recreational water areas rescue. Includes pools and ponds. Excludes ice rescue (362).
Ice rescue. Includes only cases where victim is stranded on ice or has fallen through ice.
Swift-water rescue. Includes flash flood conditions.
Surf rescue.
Watercraft rescue. Excludes rescues near the shore and in swimming/recreational areas (361). Includes people falling overboard at a significant distance from
land.
Water and ice-related rescue, other.
Electrical rescue
Electrocution or potential electrocution. Excludes people trapped by power lines (372).
Trapped by power lines. Includes people trapped by downed or dangling power lines or other energized electrical equipment.
Electrical rescue, other.
Rescue or EMS standby
Rescue or EMS standby for hazardous conditions. Excludes aircraft standby (462).
Rescue, emergency medical service (EMS) incident, other
Rescue and EMS incident, other.

Hazardous Condition (No Fire)
Combustible/Flammable spills and leaks
Gasoline or other flammable liquid spill (flash point below 100 degrees F at standard temperature and pressure (Class I)).
Gas leak (natural gas or LPG). Excludes gas odors with no source found (671).
Oil or other combustible liquid spill (flash point at or above 100 degrees F at standard temperature and pressure (Class II or III)).
Combustible and flammable gas or liquid spills or leaks, other.
Chemical release, reaction, or toxic condition
Chemical hazard (no spill or leak). Includes the potential for spills or leaks.
Chemical spill or leak. Includes unstable, reactive, explosive material.
Refrigeration leak. Includes ammonia.
Carbon monoxide incident. Excludes incidents with nothing found (736 or 746).
Toxic chemical condition, other.
Radioactive condition
Radiation leak, radioactive material. Includes release of radiation due to breaching of container or other accidental release.
Radioactive conditions, other.
Electrical wiring/Equipment problem
Heat from short circuit (wiring), defective or worn insulation.
Overheated motor or wiring.
Breakdown of light ballast.
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444
445
440
45x
451
46x
461
462
463
460
47x
471
48x
481
480
40x
400

5xx

Power line down. Excludes people trapped by downed power lines (372).
Arcing, shorted electrical equipment.
Electrical wiring/equipment problem, other.
Biological hazard
Biological hazard, confirmed or suspected.
Accident, potential accident
Building or structure weakened or collapsed. Excludes incidents where people are trapped (351).
Aircraft standby. Includes routine standby for takeoff and landing as well as emergency alerts at airports.
Vehicle accident, general cleanup. Includes incidents where FD is dispatched after the accident to clear away debris. Excludes extrication from vehicle (352) and
flammable liquid spills (411 or 413).
Accident, potential accident, other.
Explosive, bomb removal
Explosive, bomb removal. Includes disarming, rendering safe, and disposing of bombs or suspected devices. Excludes bomb scare (721).
Attempted burning, illegal action
Attempt to burn. Includes situations in which incendiary devices fail to function.482 Threat to burn. Includes verbal threats and persons threatening to set
themselves on fire. Excludes an attempted burning (481).
Attempted burning, illegal action, other.
Hazardous condition, other
Hazardous condition (no fire), other.

Service Call
51x
511
512
510
52x
521
522
520
53x
531
54x
541
542
540
55x
551
552
553
554

Person in distress
Lock-out. Includes efforts to remove keys from locked vehicles. Excludes lock-ins (331).
Ring or jewelry removal, without transport to hospital. Excludes persons injured (321).
Person in distress, other.
Water problem
Water (not people) evacuation. Includes the removal of water from basements. Excludes water rescues (360 series).
Water or steam leak. Includes open hydrant. Excludes overpressure ruptures (211).
Water problem, other.
Smoke, odor problem
Smoke or odor removal. Excludes the removal of any hazardous materials.
Animal problem or rescue.
Animal problem. Includes persons trapped by an animal or an animal on the loose
Animal rescue.
Animal problem or rescue, other.
Public service assistance
Assist police or other governmental agency. Includes forcible entry and the provision of lighting.
Police matter. Includes incidents where FD is called to a scene that should be handled by the police.
Public service. Excludes service to governmental agencies (551 or 552).
Assist invalid. Includes incidents where the invalid calls the FD for routine help, such as assisting a person in returning to bed or chair, with no transport or medical
treatment given.

92

555
550
56x
561
571
50x
500

600-Series
61x
611
62x
621
622
63x
631
632
64x
641
65x
651
652
653
650
66x
661
67x
671
672
60x
600

700-Series
71x
711
712
713

Defective elevator, no occupants.
Public service assistance, other.
Unauthorized burning
Unauthorized burning. Includes fires that are under control and not endangering property. Cover assignment, standby at fire station, move-up.
Cover assignment, assist other fire agency such as standby at a fire station or move-up.
Service call, other
Service call, other.

Good Intent Call
Dispatched and canceled en route
Dispatched and canceled en route. Incident cleared or canceled prior to arrival of the responding unit. If a unit arrives on the scene, fill out the applicable code.
Wrong location, no emergency found
Wrong location. Excludes malicious false alarms (710 series).
No incident found on arrival at dispatch address.
Controlled burning
Authorized controlled burning. Includes fires that are agricultural in nature and managed by the property owner. Excludes unauthorized controlled burning (561)
and prescribed fires (632).
Prescribed fire. Includes fires ignited by management actions to meet specific objectives and have a written, approved prescribed fire plan prior to ignition.
Excludes authorized controlled burning (631).
Vicinity alarm
Vicinity alarm (incident in other location). For use only when an erroneous report is received for a legitimate incident. Includes separate locations reported for an
actual fire and multiple boxes pulled for one fire.
Steam, other gas mistaken for smoke
Smoke scare, odor of smoke, not steam (652). Excludes gas scares or odors of gas (671).
Steam, vapor, fog, or dust thought to be smoke.
Smoke from barbecue or tar kettle (no hostile fire).
Steam, other gas mistaken for smoke, other.
EMS call where party has been transported
EMS call where injured party has been transported by a non-fire service agency or left the scene prior to arrival.
HazMat release investigation w/no HazMat found
Hazardous material release investigation with no hazardous condition found. Includes odor of gas with no leak/gas found.
Biological hazard investigation with no hazardous condition found.
Good intent call, other
Good intent call, other.

False Alarm and False Call
Malicious, mischievous false alarm
Municipal alarm system, malicious false alarm. Includes alarms transmitted on street fire alarm boxes.
Direct tie to fire department, malicious false alarm. Includes malicious alarms transmitted via fire alarm system directly tied to the fire department, not via dialed
telephone.
Telephone, malicious false alarm. Includes false alarms transmitted via the public telephone network using the local emergency reporting number of the fire
department or another emergency service agency.
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714
715
710
72x
721
73x
731
732
733
734
735
730
74x
741
742
743
744
745
746
740
75x
751
70x
700

800-Series
811
812
813
814
815
800

900-Series
91x
911
90x
900

Central station, malicious false alarm. Includes malicious false alarms via a central-station-monitored fire alarm system.
Local alarm system, malicious false alarm. Includes malicious false alarms reported via telephone or other means as a result of activation of a local fire alarm
system.
Malicious, mischievous false alarm, other.
Bomb scare
Bomb scare (no bomb).
System or detector malfunction. Includes improper performance of fire alarm system that is not a result of a proper system response to environmental stimuli
such as smoke or high heat conditions.
Sprinkler activated due to the failure or malfunction of the sprinkler system. Includes any failure of sprinkler equipment that leads to sprinkler activation with no
fire present. Excludes unintentional operation caused by damage to the sprinkler system (740 series).
Extinguishing system activation due to malfunction.
Smoke detector activation due to malfunction.
Heat detector activation due to malfunction.
Alarm system activation due to malfunction.
System or detector malfunction, other.
Unintentional system or detector operation (no fire). Includes tripping an interior device accidentally.
Sprinkler activation (no fire), unintentional. Includes testing the sprinkler system without fire department notification.
Extinguishing system activation. Includes testing the extinguishing system without fire department notification.
Smoke detector activation (no fire), unintentional. Includes proper system responses to environmental stimuli such as non-hostile smoke.
Detector activation (no fire), unintentional. A result of a proper system response to environmental stimuli such as high heat conditions.
Alarm system activation (no fire), unintentional.
Carbon monoxide detector activation (no carbon monoxide detected). Excludes carbon monoxide detector malfunction.
Unintentional transmission of alarm, other.
Biohazard scare
Biological hazard, malicious false report.
False alarm and false call, other
False alarm or false call, other.

Severe Weather and Natural Disaster
Earthquake assessment, no rescue or other service rendered.
Flood assessment. Excludes water rescue (360 series).
Windstorm. Includes tornado, hurricane, or cyclone assessment. No other service rendered.
Lightning strike (no fire). Includes investigation.
Severe weather or natural disaster standby.
Severe weather or natural disaster, other.

Special Incident Type
Citizen complaint
Citizen’s complaint. Includes reports of code or ordinance violation.
Special type of incident, other
Special type of incident, other.
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APPENDIX B - Fire Department Response Estimates
Fire Department Response Estimates (NFIRS)
Incident
Type:

110–123:
Structure
Fires*

332–381
Rescue*

311– 321
EMS
calls*

100
FIRE

200
OVERPRESSURE

300
RESCUE
& EMS

400
HAZARDOUS
CONDITION

Year:
2000
6.514%
8.233%
38.084% 19.168%
0.450%
46.318%
6.495%
2001
3.985%
9.442%
43.276% 11.564%
0.366%
52.719%
6.448%
2002
3.491%
11.041% 45.250%
9.529%
0.301%
56.291%
6.324%
2003
3.318%
13.133% 44.246%
8.699%
0.286%
57.379%
6.267%
2004
4.008%
10.476% 44.366%
8.539%
0.276%
54.842%
5.935%
2005
3.843%
10.533% 45.092%
8.210%
0.266%
55.625%
5.753%
2006
3.679%
10.589% 45.818%
7.882%
0.256%
56.407%
5.572%
2007
3.515%
10.646% 46.544%
7.554%
0.246%
57.190%
5.391%
2008
3.350%
10.702% 47.270%
7.225%
0.236%
57.973%
5.210%
2009
3.186%
10.759% 47.996%
6.897%
0.226%
58.755%
5.029%
2010
3.022%
10.816% 48.723%
6.568%
0.216%
59.538%
4.848%
2011
2.857%
10.872% 49.449%
6.240%
0.206%
60.321%
4.667%
2012
2.693%
10.929% 50.175%
5.779%
0.196%
61.103%
4.486%
2013
2.529%
10.985% 50.901%
5.453%
0.186%
61.886%
4.304%
2014
2.128%
10.997% 52.944%
4.829%
0.167%
63.941%
3.804%
2015
2.012%
11.110% 53.221%
4.590%
0.162%
64.331%
3.747%
2016
2.157%
10.800% 53.273%
4.643%
0.152%
64.072%
3.694%
2017
2.031%
11.332% 53.262%
4.371%
0.148%
64.594%
3.607%
2018
1.829%
11.288% 53.570%
4.105%
0.141%
64.857%
3.585%
2019
1.766%
11.120% 54.455%
3.900%
0.135%
65.575%
3.420%
Mean**
2.923%
10.849% 49.158%
7.540%
0.231%
60.008%
4.739%
* These incident types are subcategories of the primary series listed on the right.
** Excludes interpolated years; these averages are not weighted for annual call volumes over time.
*** Rates listed in blue were missing years and were created through linear interpolation.
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500
SERVICE
CALL
6.399%
7.074%
6.741%
6.853%
6.843%
6.883%
6.923%
6.963%
7.003%
7.043%
7.083%
7.123%
7.163%
7.203%
7.228%
7.285%
7.280%
7.256%
7.490%
7.467%
7.107%

600
GOOD
INTENT
CALLS
8.749%
9.046%
8.461%
8.510%
8.988%
9.100%
9.213%
9.325%
9.437%
9.549%
9.662%
9.774%
9.886%
9.998%
10.252%
10.209%
10.759%
10.692%
10.374%
10.239%
9.729%

700
FALSE
ALARMS

800
SEVERE
WEATHER

900
SPECIAL
INCIDENTS

11.642%
11.950%
11.581%
11.174%
11.094%
10.890%
10.686%
10.482%
10.278%
10.074%
9.871%
9.667%
9.463%
9.259%
8.879%
8.770%
8.430%
8.295%
8.475%
8.286%
9.748%

0.076%
0.152%
0.200%
0.311%
0.175%
0.175%
0.174%
0.173%
0.173%
0.172%
0.172%
0.171%
0.170%
0.170%
0.147%
0.137%
0.153%
0.182%
0.187%
0.167%
0.171%

0.704%
0.682%
0.572%
0.521%
0.651%
0.663%
0.674%
0.686%
0.697%
0.709%
0.720%
0.732%
0.743%
0.755%
0.753%
0.769%
0.817%
0.854%
0.787%
0.810%
0.727%

APPENDIX C - Exposure Rates by Incident Type
Exposure Rates by Incident Type

Exposures by Incident Type
Inc. Type:
Year
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
Fatal Crashes (n)
% of crashes
Total Exposures
% of total exposures

100
Fires
12,665,428
7,792,035
6,556,028
6,239,525
6,092,172
6,084,949
6,077,477
6,126,851
6,056,436
6,091,478
6,258,907
6,343,534
6,301,766
6,011,060
5,136,940
5,171,029
5,400,377
4,999,765
5,022,654
4,868,994
80

110-123:
130-173
Structure
Other Fires*
Fires*
6,576,186 6,089,242
3,948,707 3,843,328
3,382,070 3,173,958
3,277,578 2,961,946
3,754,726 2,337,446
3,926,630 2,158,319
3,762,909 2,314,568
3,752,577 2,374,274
3,814,985 2,241,450
3,770,648 2,320,830
3,816,678 2,442,229
3,834,953 2,508,581
3,870,183 2,431,583
3,666,343 2,344,717
3,048,744 2,088,196
3,063,173 2,107,856
3,375,975 2,024,403
3,118,901 1,880,864
2,984,896 2,037,758
2,913,784 1,955,210
50

30

200
OverPressure
258,394
224,593
190,465
188,230
187,607
188,029
192,617
193,797
187,390
190,649
195,811
201,447
205,039
195,367
185,777
193,760
181,494
173,027
177,672
171,202

300
Rescue &
EMS
14,541,717
17,713,279
19,716,104
21,092,550
19,991,995
20,902,096
22,366,185
23,539,796
23,847,495
25,463,328
27,498,953
29,808,179
32,040,070
32,321,030
33,424,113
36,037,937
37,706,751
37,362,168
39,707,811
40,731,305

311-321,
EMS calls*

322- 399
Rescue*

11,487,899
13,935,121
15,141,329
15,443,667
15,449,498
16,176,110
17,333,121
18,266,864
18,529,230
19,808,930
21,417,666
23,242,422
25,009,789
25,255,380
26,417,460
28,410,758
29,723,448
29,132,298
31,003,864
31,950,961

3,053,818
3,778,158
4,574,774
5,600,429
4,540,347
4,724,932
5,033,003
5,273,784
5,319,852
5,656,661
6,084,132
6,569,057
7,033,835
7,069,026
7,006,653
7,627,179
7,983,303
8,229,871
8,703,947
8,780,345

0

53

15

38

400
600
500
Hazardous
Good Intent
Service Call
Condition
Calls
2,758,845 2,140,379 3,913,559
3,008,482 2,523,035 4,095,001
3,009,257 2,446,500 3,844,185
3,069,503 2,533,086 3,911,345
2,888,501 2,510,349 4,150,973
2,937,427 2,661,720 4,237,870
3,002,907 2,806,844 4,578,766
3,117,889 2,894,426 4,810,103
2,997,597 2,880,086 4,759,547
3,086,313 3,019,508 5,027,723
3,184,198 3,379,498 5,532,693
3,180,220 3,455,201 5,739,338
3,333,182 3,663,610 6,071,518
3,212,797 3,668,137 6,088,365
2,864,572 3,453,526 5,860,196
3,018,440 3,671,594 6,232,154
3,072,906 3,807,919 6,896,476
2,879,959 3,682,251 6,554,340
3,015,907 4,000,439 6,701,038
2,892,563 4,003,336 6,706,846
2

1

2

700
False
Aalarms
6,187,109
6,982,859
6,956,914
6,846,052
6,665,796
6,648,872
6,785,613
6,809,356
6,575,207
6,689,474
6,880,805
7,101,168
7,263,945
6,970,281
6,572,905
6,850,092
6,840,491
6,425,409
6,960,359
6,707,750

800
Severe
Weather
37,901
74,702
93,289
144,216
88,509
89,953
93,576
95,758
94,334
97,957
102,891
108,487
113,437
111,327
98,489
99,942
111,630
121,953
130,660
120,412

6

0

900
Total Incidents
Special
(NFPA)
Incidents
271,509
20,520,000
262,978
20,965,500
210,038
21,303,500
197,031
22,406,000
253,250
22,616,500
260,895
23,251,500
274,983
24,470,000
284,975
25,334,500
284,177
25,252,500
298,575
26,534,500
317,171
28,205,000
338,062
30,098,000
357,174
31,854,000
354,027
31,644,500
332,998
31,644,500
355,049
33,635,500
401,620
35,320,000
421,477
34,683,500
402,070
36,746,500
409,064
37,272,000
Total:
0

144

55.56%
34.72%
20.83%
0.00%
36.81%
10.42%
26.39%
1.39%
0.69%
1.39%
4.17%
0.00%
0.00%
100.00%
125,297,403 73,660,644 51,636,759 3882365.09 555812863 433135815 122643105 60531462.1 63201442.7 105712034 135720455 2029421.71 6287122.68 1,058,474,570
11.84%
6.96%
4.88%
0.37%
52.51%
40.92%
11.59%
5.72%
5.97%
9.99%
12.82%
0.19%
0.59%
100.00%

Relative Crash Risk

9.31

7.11

5.13

0.00

0.53

0.17

2.74

0.23

0.11

0.13

0.30

0.00

0.00

Crash Incidence Ratio

4.69

4.99

4.27

0.00

0.70

0.25

2.28

0.24

0.12

0.14

0.32

0.00

0.00
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